Submitted by QTR's Fringe Finance

GLJ Research’s Gordon Johnson is one of my favorite analysts on the street to read and gets a rare endorsement from me (I hate basically everyone selling sell-side style research) because, like my friend Mark Spiegel, he is one of the last few analysts out there that seems committed to the truth….no matter how ridiculous it makes him look in the short term while he’s waiting for his theses to play out.

Johnson came away from this week’s Fed meeting with a conclusion that would have sounded almost absurd just a few months ago: the Fed may finally be breaking with the post-2008 playbook. And the timing couldn’t be better for the Fed to do this to make a total fool out of me. After all, I literally just predicted a month ago there’s no way they would ever stop the neverending cycle of QE they started two decades ago. Days ago, I satirically wrote that the only bear case left for markets is total human extinction.

Enter Kevin Warsh’s first press conference as Fed Chair with inflation running completely out of control. My friend GoJo makes the…err…bold claim that the Fed is not tweaking it’s post-2008 playbook…not adjusting it around the margins…breaking with it.

Johnson’s central argument is that Kevin Warsh’s first meeting as Fed Chair represented a repudiation of the Bernanke-Powell era and a return to a much older conception of central banking…one where the Fed’s primary job is delivering price stability, not reassuring investors, supporting asset prices, or providing a detailed roadmap for every future policy move.

The actual rate decision this past week was almost beside the point. The Fed held rates steady at 3.50%-3.75% for a fourth consecutive meeting. What mattered was everything around it. Warsh stripped forward guidance from the statement, calling it ill-suited to the current environment. He refused to submit his own dot-plot projection. The statement itself was shortened and reduced largely to facts. Nine of twelve participants now expect at least one hike by year-end.

Meanwhile, Warsh launched multiple task forces to reevaluate the Fed’s framework and openly emphasized the institution’s obligation to restore credibility on inflation.

Markets did not exactly celebrate at first (before, of course, turning higher on Thursday). On Wednesday, stocks sold off, gold weakened, two-year Treasury yields surged, and September hike odds nearly doubled. Investors who showed up hoping to hear some variation of “cuts are coming” instead got a lecture on inflation credibility and a reminder that the Fed’s mandate is not maximizing the S&P 500.

To Johnson, this wasn’t simply a hawkish meeting. It was the opening shot of a regime change. His view is that the modern Fed became two things after 2008. First, it became obsessed with transparency. Every possible future policy path was telegraphed through dots, forecasts, projections, speeches, press conferences, and carefully managed expectations.

Second, and more importantly what I argue all the time, is that it it became a de facto backstop for risk assets. Investors learned that serious market weakness would eventually trigger accommodation. Bad economic news became good market news because it increased the probability of Fed support.

Johnson believes Warsh is deliberately dismantling that framework. No dot. Less guidance. Fewer promises. More uncertainty. More emphasis on inflation. More willingness to surprise markets. In Gordon’s telling, the “Fed put” is not merely being questioned; it is being retired. That is a massive claim. It’s also why Johnson reaches for perhaps the biggest comparison available: Paul Volcker.

In a note out to clients this week, Johnson argues that Warsh’s intellectual instincts are fundamentally different from Bernanke’s. Bernanke’s worldview was shaped by the Great Depression and the dangers of deflation. Warsh’s appears much more shaped by the inflationary experience of the 1970s.

Johnson points to Warsh’s long-running criticism of quantitative easing, his concerns about balance-sheet expansion, and his warnings about inflation risk dating back more than a decade. He also highlights Warsh’s role during the QE2 debates, when Warsh publicly expressed skepticism about the very policies his institution was pursuing and eventually left the Board before his term expired.

In Johnson’s interpretation, today’s Warsh is the same man who spent years warning that emergency monetary policy was becoming permanent monetary policy. That’s why he sees continuity rather than reinvention. To Gordon, this isn’t a politician adopting hawkish language because it’s fashionable. It’s someone who has been making versions of the same argument for fifteen years and now finally has the votes.

This all sounds great. I hope Gordon is right. I have a sneaking suspicion that he isn’t. And before we start engraving “Volcker 2.0” onto commemorative plaques, it’s worth remembering a few things.

The first is that the easiest thing in the world for a central banker to do is talk tough. The hardest thing in the world for a central banker to do is stay tough.

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Volcker’s legacy wasn’t built on speeches, communications strategy, or symbolic changes to Fed procedures. It was built on tightening until inflation broke despite overwhelming political pressure, market turmoil, and public outrage. The real Volcker test begins when unemployment rises. The real Volcker test begins when stocks are down 25%. The real Volcker test begins when Congress starts screaming and the White House decides inflation is suddenly less important than growth.

And that has been the time where the chickenshit cowards who advocate for today’s monetary policy go into full panic mode and capitulate, sometimes on national television.

If we’re being honest, the Fed’s institutional history doesn’t exactly inspire confidence. Every cycle begins with stern declarations about price stability. Every cycle begins with promises that inflation will be defeated and that credibility is paramount. Then something breaks…a bank, a market, a major employer, a politically important sector, or the broader economy itself, and suddenly the framework gets rewritten, CNBC anchors shit themselves and act like 2 year olds throwing temper tantrums, and the Fed and Treasury come to the rescue. Then, the Fed chair at the time is praised for having “courage” and wins the Nobel Prize.

The emergency becomes permanent. The temporary facility becomes structural. The exception becomes the rule. The Fed’s modern history is not one of relentless discipline. More often than not, it’s a story of capitulation followed by a very sophisticated explanation for why capitulation was actually prudent policy all along. As Peter Schiff often says, “there’s nothing more permanent than a temporary government program”.

And that’s the part of Gordon’s thesis I’m not yet willing to underwrite.

To be clear, I’m not dismissing it. In fact, I think Johnson is right to focus on the reaction function rather than the rate decision itself. A central bank’s communication framework often tells you more than a 25-basis-point move ever could. If Warsh is truly trying to reintroduce uncertainty into markets, force investors to price risk without a guaranteed backstop, and reorient the institution around inflation rather than asset prices, that would represent a profound shift.

The problem is that every Fed chair looks tough before something important breaks.

Personally, I’m not ready to declare that Warsh is picking up where Volcker left off. I am willing to wait and see. If he continues prioritizing inflation over asset prices, if he accepts market pain as a necessary consequence of restoring credibility, and if he proves willing to keep tightening in the face of inevitable pressure, then perhaps Gordon’s thesis will prove correct.

What I do think Gordon gets right is the underlying inflation question.

As I have written repeatedly, if inflation is genuinely persistent, rate hikes are ultimately necessary. There is no magic workaround. There is no AI-powered escape hatch. There is no press-conference solution. Inflation is not defeated through clever narratives or optimistic forecasts. It is defeated through tighter monetary conditions that reduce demand, re-anchor expectations, and restore confidence in the currency.

History is fairly clear on that point, which is why so many people celebrate Volcker today while simultaneously advocating policies that would make a genuine Volcker-style campaign impossible. Everyone loves inflation fighters in retrospect. Very few people are willing to tolerate the economic pain required to actually defeat inflation in real time.

That’s why I remain skeptical. Because the Fed has spent the better part of two decades teaching markets that pain will eventually be relieved. Breaking inflation is hard. Breaking expectations and psychology that has become laden with hubris and euphoria is harder, as I wrote back in early 2025. Breaking the institution’s own reflex to intervene may be hardest of all.

So yes, Gordon may be right that the Fed put is dying. He may even be right that Warsh intends to kill it. But intentions are cheap. Every Fed chair sounds independent until the pressure arrives. Every Fed chair talks about credibility until credibility becomes expensive. As Mike Tyson said famously, “everybody’s got a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”

I love reading Gordon’s take and will continue to do so. But I’ll only believe the Fed put is dead when the next crisis arrives and the Fed refuses to revive it.

I’d love to hear your take on what you think Warsh’s tenure will look like in our ongoing discussion here. Who’s stance do you agree with more?

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