A sailor prepares a Navy MH-60R Sea Hawk to take off from the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility, Saturday, June 27, 2026. (U.S. Navy photo)

The U.S. Global Positioning System stands as America’s key part of its critical space infrastructure. It is foundational to a highly functioning society. It underpins everything from smartphones, navigation for commercial aviation, precision-guided weapons, and global financial networks. Yet despite its strategic importance, GPS modernization has too often been treated as a billpayer within defense budgeting, with funds redirected to other priorities whenever fiscal pressure emerges. That approach is shortsighted and increasingly dangerous.

GPS is the backbone of both American military power and vast sectors of critical societal and economic strength. In an era of daily Chinese and Russian attacks on GPS’ space, electromagnetic, and ground segments, the United States cannot afford delays, program instability, or another failed modernization effort. To prevent this, America must use what works, rather than the pursuit of the ambitious and perfect solution.

Architecture Evolution Plan is the Way Forward for GPS Ground

For years, the troubled Operational Control Segment (OCX) program symbolized everything wrong with overly ambitious defense acquisition. Delays, software integration problems, and cybersecurity challenges repeatedly pushed the ground segment architecture necessary for GPS III behind schedule and over budget. Eventually, confidence in the program’s ability to deliver the required capability on an operationally relevant timeline eroded significantly. As a result, the government elected to pursue alternative approaches for future GPS ground modernization while continuing to assess how best to leverage capabilities already developed under OCX.

By contrast, the Architecture Evolution Plan has quietly demonstrated something more important than acquisition theory: operational viability. Rather than attempting a massive leap to a monolithic system, the Architecture Evolution Plan will modernize the GPS ground segment incrementally while continuing to support the recently completed GPS III constellation. In today’s contested environment, that evolutionary approach may prove far more resilient, survivable, and cyber secure than another painful program restart as AEP provides 99.9% availability.

The United States should continue maturing this architecture while rigorously evaluating whether critical military capabilities such as M-Code and Regional Military Protection (RMP) are being fielded on time and at operationally relevant levels.

M-Code and Regional Military Protection (RMP) Are Key for Modern Warfare

Broadcast on GPS III satellites, M-Code uses advanced encryption and broadcasts at higher powers to slice through enemy jamming. Regional Military Protection (RMP) allows GPS satellites to focus directional beams over smaller, concentrated areas (e.g., 1,200 km wide). It dramatically boosts signal strength to overcome jammers, enhancing assured PNT access in contested environments subject to spoofing and interference. However, this technology is primarily tied to the newest GPS III Follow-On satellites and is still being rolled out across the active constellation.

As older satellites are replaced by GPS III and forthcoming GPS IIIF systems, the United States gains far more than incremental improvements. These satellites provide dramatically enhanced anti-jamming performance, improved anti-spoofing protection, and more resilient military navigation capabilities. M-Code was specifically designed to ensure secure military access to positioning and timing information even in contested environments. Regional Military Protection further strengthens this advantage by allowing theater-specific signal enhancement to protect U.S. and allied operations against enemy disruption.

Russia’s extensive GPS jamming activities in Eastern Europe and China’s growing counterspace capabilities demonstrate that future conflicts will involve aggressive attacks on positioning, navigation, and timing systems even before the first kinetic strikes occur. America’s GPS architecture must therefore be able to function in denied and degraded environments where adversaries actively attempt to jam, spoof, or disrupt operations.

The United States needs sufficient on-orbit capacity to guarantee survivable global coverage, and current assessments indicate approximately 24 operational modernized satellites are required to fully sustain worldwide military effectiveness. Slowing deployment schedules or diverting modernization funding risks creating future capability gaps that cannot easily be repaired. GPS IIIF, AEP, and RMP funding must not be allowed to remain billpayers for unrelated programs.

Fortunately, America already has momentum. The completion of the GPS III series demonstrated that the industrial base can deliver advanced capability on schedule. Meanwhile, the AEP provides a realistic and adaptable ground segment path capable of evolving alongside future generations of satellites.

Proposed Way Ahead

GPS modernization is not simply another acquisition program competing for resources. It is the foundation upon which precision strike, global logistics, joint force synchronization, financial timing, and critical infrastructure depend. Delaying modernization creates risks that compound over decades due to constellation replenishment timelines, industrial base limitations, and workforce retention challenges.

Congress and the Department of War should therefore pursue four priorities simultaneously: continue maturing the AEP as the OCX replacement and operational backbone of GPS ground; verify that M-Code and RMP are being implemented on time; accelerate GPS IIIF deployment at a realistic but faster pace; and protect GPS modernization funding from repeated budget raids.

America does not need another overengineered acquisition failure. It needs operational capability delivered on time, secured against cyber and counterspace threats, and sustained through stable investment. The AEP and GPS IIIF together offer the most practical and achievable path toward that objective.

previously served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy (2018–2019). His insights and opinions reflect independent analysis of space deterrence challenges and do not reflect the opinions of the Department of War or United States Government.

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.