An “bioethicist” has unveiled in an article in the Journal of Medical Ethics, which comes out of Oxford, his stunningly lethal suggestion that people who want to donate organs “should be able to be killed during – or a direct result of – the organ-procurement process.”

That contradicts established standards in medicine, which include the “dead donor rule,” or a requirement that organ donors must, in fact, be dead before the donation and that they cannot be killed for their organs.

A report at National Review notes that system protects the vulnerable, but is flexible enough to allow living donations of those who choose to donate one kidney, or part of a liver.

“Utilitarian bioethicists have long argued against the DDR and its corollary based on the notion that killing those who are dying or want to donate will relieve the suffering of people who want to live and need an organ,” the report said.

And it cited the comments from “Ohio bioethicist Lawrence J. Masek” who suggests killing during organ procurement isn’t a bad thing.

“First, the author pulls a typical switcheroo often seen in bioethical discourse. Here’s a relevant example: We were assured over many years that brain dead is ‘dead.’ Now, that this is accepted widely, many bioethicists are claiming that actually, it isn’t. If they are right, the DDR would preclude organ procurement from such patients. But these bioethicists claim instead that procuring organs from those diagnosed as brain dead also means that we can harvest comatose patients whose brains are clearly functioning,” the report explained.

“See how that works? Rather than stick to the rule, expand it and pretend it is not being stretched.
This is Masek’s tactic too. He claims that since taking one kidney in an altruistic living donation harms the patient through reduced kidney function without violating the DDR, it is also okay to take the liver of a patient that will lead to death a few hours later,” the report said.

Masek also claims surgery to save an unborn child harms the mother, through incisions and such.

The Masek article presents its arguments against even some routine procedures.

“Performing the c-section would cause blood loss, which would be the cause of the woman’s death, so the do-not-kill principle prohibits the c-section in this case, even though the only alternative is allowing both the woman and her child to die. I see the fact that a principle requires allowing two patients to die instead of saving one patient as a problem for the [DDR do not kill] principle,” Masek said.

Pain relief during end-of-life situations also would be wrong, he claimed.

“Another objection to the do-not-kill principle is that it prohibits lethal palliation [misnomer alert!], such as the use of an analgesic that relieves pain but also has the side-effects of slowing respiration and causing death. Lethal palliation is widely accepted even among proponents of the DDR.”

And it’s altruistic to die giving organs to others, he claimed.

“If people may jump on a grenade to save other soldiers or jump in front of a speeding motorcycle to save a child, then they may sacrifice their lives by donating a heart or other vital organ. I agree that sacrificing one’s life to save another by jumping on a grenade or in front of a motorcycle is analogous to sacrificing one’s life to save another by donating a vital organ.”

The National Review analysis, however, pointed out that such arguments are stacked hypotheticals, as many of those conditions do not necessarily kill, and if death results, it is not the intended result.

“Jumping on a grenade to save other soldiers is not the same as the soldiers throwing that person on the grenade, which would be more akin to a surgeon killing for organs,” National Review noted.

The article, by Wesley J. Smith of the Discovery Institute’s Center on Human Exceptionalism, warned such discussions are important, as “Public policy is often formulated through this very kind of back and forth in professional journals. This kind of top-down policy making is why feeding tubes can be legally withdrawn from unconscious patients and gender-confused children can be administered puberty blockers in many jurisdictions.”