At the 2025 Dubai Airshow, Russia announced that it delivered two Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighters to its first export customer, presumed to be Algeria. This delivery was unreported publicly at the time and likely involved Libya. Most international attention on Russian activities in Libya has been either supporting operations in the Sahel, rather than Algeria, or the drawdown in Syria and control of the Eastern Mediterranean, rather than West Africa. This is what the Su-57 Felon indicates about the increased importance of Libya and Algeria to Russian geopolitics, future stealth aircraft exports, as well as implications for potential operations in Venezuela.

The Su-57 Felon is produced at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant in the Russia Far East. Algeria’s premier fighters are located at Oum el Bouaghi Air Base, east of Algiers. From the Black Sea to Algeria is 1,500 nautical miles, however European airspace closures since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, increase this to 2,000 nautical miles. The range of the Su-57 is not public, however an F-22 with external tanks has a range of approximately 1,600 nautical miles. This doesn’t include fuel and flying within range of divert airfields, limited air refueling capacity, and wing removal for a supposed stealth fighter isn’t an option.

All options to ferry a Su-57 from Russia to Algeria require transiting Turkey and support from Khalifa Haftar controlled Eastern Libya. Russia operates from at least five airfields in Libya: Al Khadim AB east of Benghazi, Al Qardabiyah AB on the coast south of Sitre, Al Juffra AB in the center of the country, Brak AB southwest of Al Juffra AB, and Maatan al-Sarra AB in the southeast. If Russia aerial refueled its Su-57s en route, it could have masked the movement as routine transport operations, to Al Khadim AB. Alternatively, landing and refueling at Al Khadim AB divides a potential ferry into two 1,000 nautical mile legs. Al Qardabiyah AB is another slightly further option along the coast and hosts Russian fighter aircraft.

Libya’s importance to support stealth fighter exports is a relatively new problem for Russia. Stealth aircraft also require more frequent “depot-level maintenance” as the coating degrades to remain stealthy. In addition to airspace closures, the furthest operators of Russian aircraft are Peru and Venezuela, and were delivered by An-124 cargo aircraft. This isn’t an option for the Su-57 or future stealth aircraft because removing the Su-57’s wings breaks the stealth coating. U.S. stealth aircraft that have had their wings removed were retired. In June 2025, there was concern that a UK F-35B in grounded India would have to be dismantled.

At the November 2024 Zhuhai Air Show in China, one Su-57 was flown and another for static display was delivered with its wings removed by an An-124. Only its cockpit and IRST sensor were covered during transport, suggesting this Su-57 didn’t have stealth paint that needed protection. Additionally, the Su-57 that was flown reportedly refueled at Taiyuan Wusu Airport in Shanxi, supporting a ferry range less than 1,500 nautical miles between Komsomolsk-on-Amur and Zhuhai, Guangdong (north of Macao).

For Russia, and to a lesser extent China, this will limit future stealth aircraft sales and sustainment in the Western Hemisphere. Either production, basing, or air refueling will need to expand or aircraft will need to be transported by sea. This logistics limitation also implies that Venezuela’s Su-30s probably haven’t undergone depot-level maintenance since at least 2022.

Russia needs the Su-57 Felon to develop its first actual stealth fighter, the Su-75 Checkmate. It has failed to export to India, Iran, North Korea, Turkey, Vietnam, and the UAE, because the Su-57 doesn’t meet requirements, lack of funding, and U.S. political opposition. Algeria is important and deliveries require Libya, likely either Khadim AB or Al Qardabiyah AB, to support aerial refueling and cover enroute or landing.

Most analyses of Russia in Africa and Libya are its Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) in the Sahel or the power vacuum of France and the U.S. While Russia doesn’t currently have the resources because of its War in Ukraine, the next areas to monitor are Gao and Bamako in Mali and Guinea or Guinea-Bissau, cooperation from Brazil, and any repurposing of its aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. For all countries, more attention is required to the land and sea requirements and limitations that enable air and space operations, especially in Algeria, Libya, and Africa.

is a U.S. Air Force veteran and was previously assigned to the Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs at the Pentagon.

This article was originally published by RealClearDefense and made available via RealClearWire.