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Trump orders the Department of War to resume nuclear testing to keep pace with China and Russia. Democrats, of course, are worried nuclear testing will upset Putin. The threat of nuclear war is growing whether the U.S. increases testing or not, because Russia has changed its nuclear weapons use threshold since the Ukraine war began, and that threshold has already been exceeded.

On Wednesday, October 29, 2025, President Trump announced he had instructed the Pentagon to “immediately” resume nuclear weapons testing “on an equal basis” with other nations, ending a U.S. moratorium that began in 1992 Al JazeeraNBC News. The announcement came just before his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea NBC News.

It remains unclear whether Trump meant actual nuclear explosive tests or tests of nuclear-capable delivery systems. A Congressional Research Service report from August indicates it would take 24 to 36 months for the U.S. to conduct a nuclear test after the order is given CNN.

Trump’s reasoning was that other countries, namely Russia and China, have been testing, and he wants to maintain nuclear parity with these nations. The announcement followed Putin’s recent tests of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone.

The United States currently stands as the world’s number one military power but the number two nuclear power, led by Russia and trailed by China. According to the Arms Control Association and the Federation of American Scientists, Russia possesses approximately 5,459 nuclear weapons, compared to 5,177 for the U.S. and 600 for China.

According to the November 2024 Nuclear Employment Strategy report, the United States now faces multiple nuclear competitors. Russia poses the most acute threat with its large, modern, and diversified arsenal; China is rapidly expanding and modernizing its forces with an emerging nuclear triad; and North Korea continues to build its capabilities.

The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review affirms that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Nuclear use would only be considered in extreme circumstances to defend vital national or allied interests. The strategy emphasizes tailored deterrence with flexible capabilities, directing that the U.S. must be able to deter Russia, China, and North Korea simultaneously in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.

To achieve this, the United States maintains its nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers, alongside dual-capable fighter aircraft. ICBMs remain on day-to-day alert, while a portion of ballistic missile submarines continuously patrol at sea. The guidance further underscores the importance of keeping a human “in the loop” for all critical actions and presidential decision-making.

Since 1992, the U.S. has observed a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing, maintaining readiness at the Nevada National Security Site through the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, which ensures arsenal reliability without detonations. Although both the Trump and Biden administrations reaffirmed the moratorium, discussions periodically arise about resuming testing amid renewed competition with Russia and China.

From 1945 to 1992, the United States conducted 1,054 nuclear tests, most at the Nevada site. It remains bound by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (banning atmospheric, underwater, and space tests) and the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (limiting underground tests to under 150 kilotons). The 1992 Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment prohibited U.S. underground tests after 1996 unless another nation resumed testing. Although several nations have since done so, Washington continues to observe the moratorium.

The U.S. signed but never ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to enter into force. Russia revoked its ratification in 2023, while China, the U.S., and others have not ratified. Nevertheless, the United States continues to honor its commitment to refrain from nuclear testing.

Russia’s nuclear doctrine, officially titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” was last updated on November 19, 2024, replacing the 2020 version. The document defines the conditions under which Russia may use nuclear weapons and is binding for all government bodies.

In a September 2024 statement previewing the update, Vladimir Putin explained that the revised doctrine now treats aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, if supported by a nuclear state, as a joint attack by both nations.

The doctrine specifies that Russia may consider a nuclear response upon receiving reliable information about a massive launch of air or space attack weapons, including strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, UAVs, hypersonic weapons, and other aerial systems, crossing its borders.

The 2024 revision significantly lowers the threshold for nuclear use. The 2020 version limited nuclear response to situations in which “the very existence of the state is at risk.” The new language permits nuclear use “in the event of aggression creating a critical threat to the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Russia and Belarus.”

It explicitly extends the Russian nuclear umbrella to Belarus, with Putin stating: “We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia and Belarus as members of the Union State.”

The doctrine emphasizes safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both states. However, it does not clarify what “territorial integrity” includes. Given that Moscow considers Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson as Russian territory, these annexed regions are theoretically protected under the new threshold.

Analysts view the 2024 doctrine as part of an orchestrated effort to deter attacks on Russian or occupied territory using Western-supplied weapons. Yet, despite Ukraine’s continued strikes inside Russia and in occupied regions, no nuclear response has been triggered. This suggests that Moscow’s lowered nuclear threshold may function more as a psychological deterrent, a scare tactic, than an operational policy.

Ukraine has repeatedly launching attacks inside Russia and in Russian-occupied territories without provoking a nuclear response. This suggests that Moscow’s decision to lower its nuclear threshold may have been intended primarily as a psychological deterrent, a scare tactic that has so far failed to alter the course of the war.

Meanwhile, in the United States, renewed discussion of nuclear testing has sparked sharp political debate. Advocates argue that resuming tests could strengthen deterrence, improve technical data, and enhance U.S. leverage in negotiations with Russia and China.

Opponents counter that such actions would risk igniting a new arms race, undermine global nonproliferation norms, and endanger public health and the environment. Democrats swiftly condemned the idea, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the 30-year moratorium on nuclear testing.

Senator Jacky Rosen of Nevada said it “directly contradicts the commitments I secured from Trump nominees,” who had assured her that explosive nuclear testing was unnecessary. Representative Dina Titus, also from Nevada, pledged to introduce legislation blocking any resumption of testing.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire, ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called the proposal “dangerous and reckless,” warning that it would revive a harmful chapter of U.S. history.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin continue to build their nuclear arsenals and test at will, facing no internal opposition.