Saudi Arabia is making a power play against Hamas in Gaza
Saudi Arabia aims to reassert its regional influence by pressing Hamas and Israel to resolve their ongoing war in the Gaza Strip.
The campaign comes as U.S.-backed ceasefire talks continue to fail, prompting Riyadh to help rally Western nations toward a new wave of international recognition for Hamas' rival government, the Palestinian National Authority (PA, or PNA), and underlined by the kingdom's decision to sign a statement backed by fellow Arab powers and European nations calling for Hamas' disarmament.
These parallel developments have the potential to mark a turning point for Saudi Arabia's role in the conflict.
"Saudi Arabia is now in the driver's seat," Nawaf Obaid, a former special adviser to two Saudi ambassadors and consultant to the Saudi Royal Court, told Newsweek.
He argued that "the real challenge lies" today in how Saudi Arabia, "by far the most influential Arab country, both in terms of regional leverage and global diplomacy," would be able to press forward in its bid to gain concessions from both Hamas and Israel, while elevating the West Bank-based PA to a position in which it would be able to preside over a unified Palestinian state.
"The central question that's been lingering for a while now is Saudi Arabia's role—not just in the Middle East, but far beyond it," Obaid, now a senior research fellow at King's College London, said. "Its importance continues to grow, and it's increasingly clear that if a Palestinian state ever emerges, it will be because of Saudi Arabia.
"That is the key formula that many still haven't fully grasped," he added.

Saudi Arabia's relationship with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was forged early on in the history of the kingdom. Saudi Arabia, which was proclaimed by founder King Ibn Saud in 1932, was among the Arab nations to reject the United Nations' Israeli-Palestinian partition plan in 1947 and send troops to battle the newly declared Israel the following year.
While Saudi Arabia's military role would remain limited in the following decades, the ruling House of Saud remained a major player in Arab views toward the conflict, having cultivated a unique level of regional influence, boosted by its custodianship of the Islam's two holiest sites of Mecca and Medina.
Today, this position is further compounded by Riyadh's rapid economic growth and leading roles in regional blocs such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council and Organization of Islamic Cooperation. In addition to building upon its long-standing relationship with the United States, Saudi Arabia has also invested in growing ties with China and Russia at a time when Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was pursuing historic transformations at home.
Yet the region's dynamics have also shifted substantially since the last Arab-Israeli war that rocked the region more than half a century ago. The war in Gaza, likely deadlier than all previous Arab-Israeli conflicts combined, has pitted Israel against Hamas and a coalition of non-state actors backed by Iran.
While Hamas' Muslim Brotherhood-inspired brand of militant Islamist ideology is widely rejected among the leaders of Arab states, regional governments have chosen their messaging carefully throughout the conflict. The last Arab peace plan, spearheaded by Egypt, did not once mention Hamas by name when it was first drafted in March.
The call for Hamas to abandon its weapons during the French and Saudi-led conference in New York last week constituted a departure from this approach.
Behind the scenes, Obaid argued that Saudi Arabia has begun to turn up the pressure against Hamas, whose military position has degraded significantly since the start of the war, though it continues to mount deadly attacks against Israeli forces.
"On the Hamas front, Saudi Arabia exerts influence indirectly, particularly through Egypt and Qatar," Obaid said. "And the Qataris, frankly, are feeling the pressure. Their close association with Hamas is now a liability, and it's in their own interest to facilitate Hamas's agreement to the Saudi-led plan."
Qatar, which hosts Hamas' main political office abroad, was notably among the Arab nations to call for the group's disarmament for the first time last week.
Obaid said it was his understanding that "some key figures within Hamas have already agreed to the Saudi request," yet "the remaining question is not if, but when the rest will follow—and how the transfer of power to the Palestinian Authority and its security forces will be managed."
"For that to happen," he added, "there must be a permanent ceasefire, and that's the biggest hurdle."
And while U.S. and Israeli officials accuse Hamas of standing in the way of an end to the war, Obaid argued that "Israel remains the core obstacle—not merely as a state actor, but because of the political fate of one man," Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Netanyahu has vowed to continue all of the remaining hostages held by Hamas were released, the group was defeated and Gaza could no longer pose a threat to Israel. He has expressed opposition to allowing the PA to take control of Gaza and has preferred President Donald Trump's earlier plan to resettle Palestinians away from the territory, or, according to recent reports, have Israel reassume direct occupation of Gaza, as it did from 1967 to 2005.
Such statements appear to have further galvanized Saudi Arabia's effort to enhance its position on the conflict.
Eyad Alrefai, an instructor at King Abdulaziz University in Saudi Arabia, argued that "Saudi Arabia's efforts to pressure Israel regarding its actions, particularly in Gaza, are part of a broader goal to achieve a more balanced and equitable approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."
This includes acknowledging that Hamas' rule over Gaza, which the group seized from the PA amid post-election clashes in 2007, and the lingering disunity has only brought setbacks to the Palestinian statehood cause.
"The Kingdom recognizes that for any meaningful progress to materialize, it is crucial to address the internal divisions among Palestinians," Alrefai told Newsweek. "The governance of Gaza by Hamas has often been marked by conflict, political infighting, and a lack of a cohesive and strategic approach in negotiations with Israel."
"This fragmentation complicates the prospects for peace and undermines the credibility of Palestinian leadership in the eyes of the international community," Alrefai said.

Thus far, Hamas has publicly pushed back at the Arab demand for disarmament, particularly after media outlets cited President Donald Trump's special envoy to the Middle East and lead Israel-Hamas negotiator, Steve Witkoff, as saying the group had agreed to such terms.
"We reaffirm that the resistance and its arms represent a national and legal right as long as the occupation remains in place—a right recognized by international charters and conventions," Hamas said in a statement issued Saturday.
"We will never relinquish this right until all our national rights are restored, foremost among them the establishment of an independent, fully sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital," the group added.
Yet Alrefai pointed out that Riyadh's "pragmatic strategy" in "setting clear terms for Hamas" could prove pivotal in shifting the dynamics of the conflict, especially in a way that paved the path for an empowered PA.
"By advocating for the cessation of Hamas's rule in Gaza and facilitating a transfer of power to the Palestinian National Authority, Saudi Arabia seeks to promote a unified Palestinian leadership," Alrefai said. "This unification is essential, as it could result in a more credible negotiating partner for both Israel and the international community."
"A consolidated Palestinian front would likely be viewed as more legitimate and effective," he added, "opening the door for greater international support for peace initiatives."
Alrefai pointed out that Saudi Arabia had "has several strategic tools at its disposal to pressure Hamas into compliance with a peace agreement that facilitates the transfer of power in Gaza to the Palestinian National Authority."
"These include leveraging diplomatic influence within the Arab League and among Muslim nations to politically isolate Hamas, providing economic incentives such as financial support to the PNA contingent on Hamas relinquishing control, and mediating reconciliation initiatives to foster dialogue between Hamas and the PNA that lead to power sharing or a full transfer of power," Alrefai said.
"Additionally," he added, "mobilizing public opinion across the Arab world can increase pressure on Hamas to comply with expectations for a unified Palestinian leadership, while offering security assistance to the PNA can enhance its governance capabilities, serving as a deterrent against Hamas's continued rule."
At the same time, Saudi Arabia could also "pressure Israel," he argued, by utilizing "the prospect of normalizing relations, working with global powers to advocate for a unified stance that calls for an end to the occupation and supports Palestinian statehood."
Reports indicate that Saudi Arabia and Israel had discussed normalization under the auspices of the U.S. in the lead-up to Hamas' October 2023 surprise attack that sparked the ongoing war in Gaza.
The kingdom has maintained, however, that such a move could only be taken in the event of a framework that would pave the way for Palestinian statehood, now the crux of Saudi Arabia's diplomatic push in Gaza.
This "multifaceted strategy," as Alrefai described it, "involves diplomatic, economic, and security measures aimed at unifying Palestinian leadership while leveraging its influence to encourage Israel's compliance with a peace agreement."

Given its long-standing relationship with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Saudi Arabia is no stranger to peace initiatives.
As far back as 1981, then-Crown Prince and future King Fahd proposed an eight-point plan that called for an Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied after the 1967 Six-Day War—including Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem—as well as the Palestinian right to return and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
A second Saudi-led proposal was launched in 2002, the "Arab Peace Initiative," which was built upon the 1981 framework, this time offering Arab-Israeli normalization in exchange for Israeli withdrawals and Palestinian statehood.
The 2002 plan, though opposed by Israel and sidestepped by the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco through their establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel via the Abraham Accords, continues to serve broadly as the basis for the Arab League's position.
Saudi Arabia has also previously weighed in on the rift between Hamas and the PA's leading Fatah faction, overseeing the 2007 Mecca Agreement that sought to establish an ultimately unrealized Palestinian unity government.
"Collectively, these efforts represent a continuous narrative of Saudi initiatives designed to lay a political and security foundation upon which a viable Palestinian state can be established," Hesham Alghannam, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Middle East Center and director general of Naïf Arab University for Security Sciences' Strategic Studies and National Security Programs, told Newsweek.
Now, Alghannam argued, the recent "New York Declaration" represents a new chapter in Saudi Arabia's historic engagement on the issue, through its "calling for an immediate cessation of the Gaza war, affirming that the Gaza Strip is an integral part of the future Palestinian state, and demanding its unification with the West Bank under the principle of 'one state, one weapon,' achieved through disarming Hamas and transferring all weaponry to the Palestinian Authority's security forces."
He warned, however, that such a declaration, as with past initiatives, was "not a magic wand." It would require not only Israeli buy-in, he said, but also the kind of international guarantees that eluded the 1990s Oslo peace accords, which established the PA but were followed by renewed violence rather than the era of peace that was promised.
As such, Alghannam explained that the new initiative "advocates for a comprehensive package of international guarantees linking the disarmament of factions to tangible steps: halting settlements, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian cities and territories, establishing a multinational peacekeeping force to manage the security vacuum in Gaza, and a reconstruction aid package conditioned upon sustained calm."
"Without these safeguards," he said, "the principle of 'one weapon' risks becoming 'no weapon' in the face of annexation bulldozers."

Even with support from Saudi Arabia and other nations, the PA finds itself in a fraught position as the war in Gaza approaches the two-year mark on October 7.
At 89 years old, PA President Mahmoud Abbas is as old as Saudi King Salman, yet the Palestinian leader lacks a clear successor. The Palestinian leader's two-decade rule has been increasingly subject to claims of corruption, calls for new elections and challenges from both Israel and Hamas.
On one side, Israeli officials also accuse the PA of tolerating militant groups and Netanyahu himself has objected to the replacement of Hamas with a "Fatah-stan." On the other, supporters of the more popular Hamas and other armed factions accuse Abbas' administration of too closely cooperating with Israel and have undermined his government through independent activity.
Such unrest, coupled with growing Israeli military and settler activity, has turned the West Bank into a war zone on the sidelines of the war in Gaza, further eroding the PA's position and throwing into question the very viability of Palestinian statehood.
The hope, according to Alrefai, would be that Saudi intervention could serve as a much-needed boost to the PA's fragile position.
"As the PNA garners increased international recognition, Saudi Arabia's endorsement of it over Hamas will serve to enhance the PNA's legitimacy," Alrefai said. "This elevation in status could translate into increased international aid and support for Palestinian state-building efforts, which are vital for the long-term viability and sustainability of a Palestinian state."
But there are "significant challenges" involved with such an endeavor, Alrefai said, not least of which include the fact that "Hamas commands substantial support in Gaza, and any attempt to curtail its influence could provoke backlash and lead to further conflict."
"The deep-rooted historical grievances and the intricate dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict imply that any transition must be managed with great care to avoid exacerbating existing tensions," he said.
Meanwhile, Alghannam said "several critical aspects remain overlooked" as the debate plays out over how Saudi Arabia could play a substantial role on this front.
"Reforming the Palestinian Authority—including elections, transparency, and modernization of security forces—is imperative to ensure that disarmament does not translate into unilateral dismantlement of national legitimacy," Alghannam said. "Transitional justice regarding crimes committed in Gaza and the West Bank is essential to prevent cycles of violence."
"Economic recovery is even more urgent than constitutional arrangements," he added, "a collapsed economy will create a vacuum quickly filled by more extremist factions."
Perhaps even more difficult to approach will be what Alghannam calls "the refugee issue—right of return or compensation," which he said "must be addressed from the outset rather than postponed to 'final status' negotiations, or the agreement risks being suspended in legal and moral limbo."
So, while he felt that "the two-state solution remains the most persuasive framework," he argued at the same that "its success hinges on three indivisible components: an Israeli willingness to transcend settlement ideology, international guarantees that are implemented rather than merely promised, and unified Palestinian performance capable of consolidating arms under law instead of shattering it at the first test."
"Saudi Arabia has once again opened the door," Alghannam said. "It is now incumbent upon the international community to demonstrate it has learned from Oslo's failure, ensuring this time the clauses are not written with the same ink used to sketch expansionist plans onto maps of the West Bank."