Political scientist and national security expert Robert Pape is warning that the Trump administration's new civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia marks one of the most consequential changes in U.S. nuclear policy in decades.

The University of Chicago professor, considered a leading expert on the intersection of politics and military conflict, argues the deal effectively places the kingdom on the threshold of becoming a nuclear weapons-capable state while signaling preparations for a broader regional confrontation with Iran.

Writing in his new Substack series, Pape contends the agreement represents "a fundamental change in the rules of the nuclear age" because it permits Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium without requiring the stringent safeguards Washington has traditionally demanded of its nuclear partners.

"The United States has quietly abandoned one of the central rules of the nuclear age," Pape wrote, arguing that the decision is driven "not primarily because of Saudi Arabia, but because the White House appears to be preparing the region for a potentially much larger confrontation with Iran."

The agreement allows Saudi Arabia to pursue uranium enrichment under a 30-year civil nuclear cooperation pact.

Unlike previous U.S. agreements with countries such as the United Arab Emirates, it does not require Riyadh to adopt the so-called "Gold Standard," under which nations permanently renounce domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

Pape also notes that the agreement does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors broader authority to verify peaceful nuclear activities.

According to Pape, the strategic rationale extends far beyond civilian energy production.

He argues the administration has shifted away from the Biden administration's approach, which tied nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia to normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords.

Instead, he says the White House is strengthening regional partners individually to prepare for the possibility that the conflict with Iran could widen.

"The common thread is strategic rather than diplomatic," Pape wrote.

"Rather than waiting for a grand Middle East peace settlement, the White House appears to be quietly assembling the political and military relationships it may need to sustain future heavier military operations against Iran."

Pape also points to recent U.S. moves signaling a willingness to restore Turkey's access to the F-35 fighter program, along with expanded energy cooperation with Iraq, as part of what he describes as a broader wartime coalition strategy surrounding Iran.

His analysis has added to concerns already expressed by some foreign policy hawks and Israeli security analysts, who have questioned whether Washington is granting major strategic concessions to regional powers without securing corresponding commitments to Israel's long-term security.

Unlike previous negotiations, the Saudi nuclear agreement reportedly was not conditioned on Riyadh's joining the Abraham Accords, a key objective pursued by the Biden administration.

Senate leaders, including the late Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., had also viewed Saudi-Israeli normalization as a requirement for any nuclear deal.

Pape argues the greatest long-term risk is that Saudi Arabia is becoming what nuclear experts call a "threshold state" — a country possessing nearly all of the technological capability necessary to produce nuclear weapons if its political leadership decides to do so.

"Uranium enrichment is not a weapon, but it is the single most important step toward one," he wrote.

Once enrichment technology is mastered, he argues, "the distinction between a civilian and military program increasingly depends on political decisions rather than technical capability."

Pape notes that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has previously stated publicly that the kingdom would seek nuclear weapons if Iran ultimately acquires them.

While stressing that enrichment itself does not constitute a weapons program, Pape argues that much of the difficult engineering required for producing a bomb lies in developing indigenous enrichment capabilities.

Beyond the Middle East, Pape believes the agreement could have worldwide consequences.

He argues that nuclear proliferation historically spreads through what he calls a "demonstration effect," with rival states following one another's pursuit of nuclear capabilities.

By permitting uranium enrichment for Saudi Arabia, he contends Washington may unintentionally lower political barriers for other allies and competitors to seek similar capabilities.

"The precedent may prove even more important than the technology," Pape wrote.

He predicts governments in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and parts of Eastern Europe could closely study the Saudi agreement as they evaluate their long-term security options amid growing geopolitical competition.

Pape concludes that the agreement reflects a broader transformation in American grand strategy, in which competition among major powers is beginning to outweigh decades of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Pape, however, cautions that the decision may ultimately reshape the global nuclear landscape.

"Once Washington accepts uranium enrichment for one strategically important ally," he wrote, "every rival with nuclear ambitions has reason to believe the political barriers to becoming a threshold state have just become lower."