The Iran Cease-Fire Ceases

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A projectile approaches a target at an unknown location during what U.S. Central Command says are strikes on Iran, in a screen grab taken from a handout video released July 12, 2026. (U.S. Central Command/Handout via Reuters)

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Missiles are flying again in the Persian Gulf, and a memorandum of understanding that tilted heavily toward Iran appears to be consigned to history. We hope now that a lesson that should never have been necessary has now been learned: Iran cannot be trusted. That was true before the MOU, it is true now, and it will be true for as long as Iran is still the kind of state it is today.

If Iran believes that, by breaking an agreement it has just signed, it can steal a march on the U.S., that’s what it will do. Not unjustifiably, the Iranian leadership regarded the MOU as an admission of weakness. The U.S. had subjected it to a punishing air campaign, and despite heavy losses in its leading ranks, the regime had not only survived but also shattered an international taboo by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz. This was something it had never done before, although it came close during its war with Iraq. Under the circumstances, it is not entirely surprising that the Iranians decided they could push their luck by attacking vessels in the strait again, a breach of the MOU surely calculated to demonstrate their de facto control of the waterway.

Rightly, the U.S. did not turn a blind eye in the interest of a “peace process” that Tehran had already shown to be a sham. Instead, it hit (and is hitting) Iran hard. That is the right response, as is the decision to restore sanctions on the sale of Iranian oil. The administration will have to accept that a popular uprising is not going to topple the Tehran regime for now. But it should never accept that Iran has the right to block the strait, an act that contravenes international law and custom, sets a dangerous precedent with regard to other maritime chokepoints, and, as we have already seen, has the potential to do serious harm to the global economy.

Firing missiles into Iran for a few days is not going to do the trick. Most of those who own, operate, or insure vessels going through the strait must, before they approve a sailing, have the confidence that ships can travel that route without serious risk of attack. To that end, the administration will have to stay the course. It will presumably require considerable effort and time, but we certainly have the forces to do the job, and one hopes that we will — in the best American tradition — find innovative military means to recover the situation after initial failure.

Politically, the administration has made its position more difficult by failing to secure either congressional approval or public support for its actions in the Gulf. Perhaps securing free transit through the Strait of Hormuz is a sufficiently clear-cut issue to attract more support both at home and abroad. The Gulf states, many Asian countries, and the Europeans are all hurt by the strait’s being rendered impassible. Perhaps they might help out. But if the administration is to attract allies, it must take the high ground. This has been made difficult by the president’s floating the notion that the U.S. should, as the strait’s “guardian,” impose a levy on vessels going through it (an idea that has since been jettisoned) or, for that matter, expecting “MASSIVE” investments in the U.S. from the Gulf states in return.

On June 23, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, “No country is allowed to charge tolls or fees on an international waterway. That’s existing international law. That’s the way it is.” Indeed. That is the argument the U.S. should be making — and enforcing.