What Is Somaliland, and Do We Have to Care About It?

www.nationalreview.com

Israel has done it again. The Jewish state has gotten itself condemned by such unimpeachable international actors as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab League, and the African Union after Jerusalem formally recognized the independence of the breakaway state of Somaliland on December 26.

Israel’s extension of geopolitical legitimacy to the East African polity represents a “clear violation of international law,” according to the Arab League’s Ahmed Aboul Gheit, and “sets a dangerous precedent that threatens regional and international security and stability.”

The European Union has been quieter, but the EU’s functionaries insist that Somalia’s territorial integrity must be respected. China, too, has reaffirmed its support for that country’s sovereignty over Somaliland. Even some of Israel’s strategic partners in the region — the governments of Egypt and Jordan, for example — joined with other Muslim-dominated governments to warn that Israel’s actions may have “serious repercussions” for peace and security in the region.

Will they? More importantly, should Americans care if the Somali government in Mogadishu retains control over the tiny parcel of East African land?

As strategic territories go, Somaliland occupies some auspicious turf. It is positioned on Somalia’s coast along the Gulf of Aden across the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait — a naval battlefield where the war against the Iran-backed Houthi raiders has raged with varying degrees of intensity for years. Before 1960, it was British Somaliland, a U.K. protectorate. It enjoyed independence and international recognition, including by the United States, for all of five days. In a spasm of pan-African nationalism, the Somaliland government opted to join with the formerly Italian-governed colony of Somalia to form a unified Somali-dominated nation.

“Greater Somalia” soon became a source of resentment, particularly in Somaliland, when Somali despot Siad Barre brutally suppressed opposition in the north, prosecuting clan rivalries under the guise of national security. The civil war and ethnic cleansing that followed did not end until the Barre regime collapsed in 1991, leading to Somalia’s descent into chaos.

Amid that chaos, however, Somaliland scratched out a semiautonomous role for itself that contrasts with the social covenant that prevails in the rest of Somalia. It has its own government, military, and currency. It conducts its own internationally monitored elections in which incumbents occasionally lose. Its economy is growing, driven primarily by strategic development initiatives at Somaliland’s foremost port, Berbera, with the aid of foreign investment.

Israel’s strategic competitors in the region fear Jerusalem’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence will pave the way for the deployment of Israel Defense Forces assets to the Horn of Africa. Israel may be seeking to boost Ethiopia’s influence in the region (Ethiopia and Somalia share an unsettled border over which both states have squabbled since the 19th century). Israel’s move represents a challenge to Cairo and Riyadh, both of which view the Horn of Africa as within their spheres of influence, and it aligns Jerusalem with regional states like the United Arab Emirates, which has invested heavily in Somaliland’s development. China’s support for Mogadishu’s claim to Somaliland is tied up with its ambition to occupy Taiwan, which has also extended formal recognition to Somaliland. Moscow, which once maintained a Soviet-era naval presence in Berbera, plays all sides in this conflict, but observers believe Russia is determined to reestablish that presence.

So, where does that leave the United States? The New York Post reported last Friday that Donald Trump’s administration will not follow Benjamin Netanyahu’s lead in formally recognizing Somaliland. Not “quickly,” at least. “Does anyone know what Somaliland is, really?” the president mused during a phone interview with Post reporters from his West Palm Beach golf course. “We’ll study it,” he pledged.

Trump’s coolness toward Israel’s diplomatic initiative notwithstanding, Somaliland is not as isolated as the president’s remarks might suggest. The U.S. maintains extensive, albeit informal, diplomatic relations with the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa. So, too, do America’s allies, including Denmark, the Netherlands, and the U.K. Military-to-military relations between the U.S. and Somaliland are robust — a strategic necessity given the ongoing U.S. military campaign against the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab.

Over the summer, some within Trump’s orbit speculated that the president might make a “bold move” before the end of the year by recognizing Somaliland on the condition that it would shelter Palestinian refugees displaced amid the conflict in the Gaza Strip. “We’re working on that right now,” Trump told reporters on August 8. “Somaliland is also offering the White House access to rare earth minerals essential for high-tech industries, such as lithium and silicon quartz,” Fox News reported at the time.

But Trump is, for now, holding his cards close. The stakes at play are, however, quite high. Control of the strategically vital Berbera port is in the balance. Mogadishu, which cannot even maintain control of its own capital in the absence of U.S. military support, is a basket case relative to its self-governing territories like Somaliland and Puntland. And Somaliland is already a dependable partner in America’s activities in the region.

“Somaliland has emerged as a critical security and diplomatic partner for the United States, helping America advance our national security interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond,” Senator Ted Cruz wrote in August. “It possesses capable armed forces and contributes to regional counterterrorism and piracy operations. It has proposed hosting a U.S. military presence near the Red Sea along the Gulf of Aden.”

Those facts have made Somaliland a thorn in the side of America’s adversaries. Recognizing the state’s overtures to America and its allies would be to take our own side in a fight. The Trump administration may resent Netanyahu’s impulsive unilateralism (it’s a growing club), but Israel’s actions have the potential to upend a sclerotic status quo in the region. It is an experiment worth pursuing.