For years, military theorists and political scientists have argued that airpower is overrated and, in some ways, outmoded. Some point to the proliferation of small, cheap unmanned drones as evidence that traditional air superiority—the ability to control the skies—has been rendered obsolete. According to this view, technological innovation has made “air denial”—merely restricting an adversary’s ability to operate freely in the air—a sufficient replacement.

Others cite a “smart bomb trap,” the idea that leaders have grown overconfident in the ability of precision airstrikes to coerce states into submission. These critics argue that airpower alone cannot achieve political objectives and in fact often leads to endless, pointless bombing campaigns. The political scientist Robert Pape, for example, asserted in 1996 that “no strategic bombing campaign has ever yielded decisive results.” Underneath these critiques is a clear message: airpower is too limited, too expensive, or too reliant on the promises of technological innovations to matter much.

Then, in June, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, an air campaign against Iran. Over the course of just 12 days, Israel’s air force flew around 1,500 combat sorties, conducted more than 600 aerial refuelings, and struck over 900 Iranian targets, including hardened nuclear facilities, missile batteries, and military command centers. The results were decisive: Iran’s nuclear program was significantly disrupted, key elements of its air defense network were shattered, and Tehran’s military leadership suffered serious blows. All the while, not a single manned Israeli aircraft was lost.

Although Israel did not fully eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, its air campaign delayed, degraded, and deterred Iran’s ambitions, and further transformed the Middle East’s political landscape. Rising Lion was a stunning demonstration of what a modern air force, backed by sound strategy and political resolve, can accomplish. It reaffirmed airpower’s ability to achieve meaningful political outcomes without a drawn-out ground war.

CLEARING THE AIR

The 1991 U.S.-led Desert Storm air campaign established the tenets of modern air warfare: gain air superiority, simultaneously strike key enemy centers of gravity, use stealth and precision, and prioritize desired effects over attrition of forces alone. Israel adapted those lessons. The Israeli air force used stealth F-35I fighter jets to suppress and destroy Iranian surface-to-air missile batteries. These aircraft provided real-time targeting information to nonstealth F-15I and F-16I fighters, which carried out precision strikes on additional targets. Uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) collected intelligence, jammed communications, and allowed Israel to deliver additional precision-guided munitions.

This devastating combination of stealth, precision, and persistent surveillance allowed Israel to quickly gain and maintain air superiority. By degrading Iranian defenses, Israel also cleared the way for the United States’ Operation Midnight Hammer, in which B-2 stealth bombers struck deeply buried nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz, reachable only by U.S. Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs.

Some critics have pointed out that the campaign failed to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But Israel’s objective in Operation Rising Lion was to disrupt and delay Iran’s nuclear weapons program while retaining the ability to strike again—not to eradicate it. By those standards, Rising Lion was a resounding success. By crippling key enrichment and weapons-support sites, eliminating senior military and scientific personnel, and gaining air superiority over Iran, Israel imposed a strategy of denial by delay—all without committing ground forces to Iran or becoming entangled in a prolonged conflict. Indeed, any Iranian efforts to enrich uranium or rebuild facilities will now occur under the shadow of Israeli precision air attacks.

Investing in air superiority is not optional for American security.

Critically, Israel achieved all its aims efficiently and effectively. It gained air superiority despite the thousands of miles separating it from Iran, in 12 days, and with zero casualties. Such results were possible only via airpower. No ground campaign could have hit these facilities so quickly, with such precision and intensity, and without any casualties.

To be sure, Rising Lion was not an air-only campaign. It was a tightly integrated, multidomain operation. Cyber-operations disrupted Iranian command and control. Space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms provided near-real-time targeting data. Electronic warfare helped disrupt enemy radars. Covert ground teams inside Iran used small drones to suppress defenses and relay coordinates. And an extensive set of military actions waged over several years in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria had already severely degraded Iran’s regional proxies, blunting Tehran’s ability to retaliate.

Together, these elements gave Israel an overwhelming advantage. But it was airpower that played the predominant role. It provided the tempo, reach, and the punch that made Rising Lion such an unqualified success.

NEW TOOLS, SAME LESSON

Leading-edge airpower capabilities have improved markedly since Desert Storm, when aircraft lacked accurate sensing technology, real-time connectivity, and all-weather munitions. Today’s fifth-generation fighters, such as the F-35, can integrate data from a variety of onboard sensors, fuse it into accurate targeting information, and share it with other aircraft. F-35s function as integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensor-shooters, giving users more information and digital connectivity that they can use to precisely strike targets as they are revealed. Their stealth allows them to operate inside contested airspace. As a result of these innovations, fewer fifth-generation aircraft are needed to achieve what would otherwise require dozens of less capable nonstealth aircraft.

Technological advances are not restricted to modern combat aircraft, however. Air defenses have become cheaper and more adaptable than ever. Artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems, and advanced information integration are changing the character of warfare. In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, for example, Azerbaijan used a network of Bayraktar TB2 drones, loitering munitions, and real-time targeting data to devastating effect against Armenian forces. But even in the face of evolving modes of warfare, airpower’s inherent advantages endure. Airpower can still be used to change adversary behavior, enforce strategic redlines, and reshape regional military balance—all without bleeding a country’s treasury or excessively risking its sons and daughters. In fact, Russia’s inability to achieve air superiority over Ukraine turned what the Kremlin assumed would be a fast and simple invasion into a grinding war of attrition. Israel, by contrast, used modern airpower to avoid such a trap. It did not involve significant ground forces and has thus avoided falling into an endless war—Washington’s fate in Afghanistan and Iraq.

All this doesn’t mean air campaigns alone can do everything: operations from any domain never achieve victory in isolation. Critics of airpower, however, miss that airpower does not simply enable the use of other kinds of operations. Rather, it is a unique instrument of strategic leverage. In the modern era, air superiority is not just a prerequisite for joint success; it can be the decisive factor. In other words, Israel’s air campaign did not just set back Iran’s nuclear program. It reaffirmed that airpower can be the foundation of modern military success. U.S. defense planners should pay attention. Investing in air superiority is not optional for American security. It is essential.