Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s inaugural visit to Washington next month comes with high expectations. In President Donald Trump’s words, the new prime minister offers an opportunity for a “tremendous new chapter” in U.S.-Iraq relations. For that to happen, however, Zaidi will need to address several issues that have complicated ties between Baghdad and Washington.

The first is the role of Iran-backed militias, known as Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in Iraq. The Trump administration has made clear it has little tolerance for armed groups operating outside state authority. These militias have launched attacks against Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and U.S. personnel and assets in Iraq.

The United States would welcome a stronger security partnership with Iraq, including to address challenges posed by Iran and the Islamic State. Such a partnership, however, cannot fully develop until Iraq reins in Tehran’s proxy networks.

To his credit, Zaidi, who assumed office on May 14, has sought to address the issue by forming a committee tasked with bringing the PMF under state authority. Several militias have agreed to integrate their forces, but others—including the powerful pro-Iran Kataib Hezbollah—have resisted.

Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey and special envoy for Iraq and Syria, praised Zaidi’s actions to date while adding they are “only the beginning.”

A second priority is strengthening U.S.-Iraq energy cooperation. Iraq is one of the world’s leading energy producers, possessing the fifth-largest proven oil reserves and the eleventh-largest natural gas reserves.

The Iraq-Turkey pipeline, which runs through the energy-rich Kurdistan Region, can transport approximately 1.6 million barrels of oil per day. Zaidi’s government has prioritized expanding production and exports through this corridor, offering U.S. and international oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region security guarantees against future militia attacks and compensation for damages from PMF strikes.

These steps are welcome, but Iraq can do more to restore investor confidence. Baghdad should recognize and honor contracts signed between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and international oil companies (IOCs). According to reports, these companies are owed roughly $1.6 billion in accumulated arrears.

Until these obligations are met, Iraq will struggle to attract the investment needed to fully develop its energy sector.

Zaidi should resolve this issue before arriving in Washington, as doing so would reassure investors and demonstrate to the Trump administration that Iraq is serious about economic reform and commercial partnership.

A third opportunity for Zaidi is improving relations between Baghdad and the KRG. A more cooperative relationship would advance not only Iraqi interests but also broader U.S. strategic objectives.

The Kurdistan Region’s contributions to energy production, foreign investment, and regional stability benefit the entire country. Yet the KRG has often had to negotiate for its share of the national budget, salary payments, and energy revenues. A more predictable framework would strengthen Iraq politically and economically.

The Kurdistan Region also remains one of America’s most reliable security partners in the Middle East. Iraqi Kurdish forces have played a vital role in countering both Iranian influence and the continuing threat of the Islamic State. U.S. Assistant Secretary of War for International Affairs Daniel Zimmerman recently said it is difficult to find “a more willing, capable group to work alongside.”

Relations between Baghdad and Erbil appear to be improving. KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said this week that he looks “forward with optimism” to relations with the new government and particularly with Zaidi. Earlier this month, at Barzani’s request, Zaidi met with KRG officials and U.S. and international energy executives to address security concerns affecting companies operating in the region.

The KRG can also help strengthen U.S.-Iraq ties by developing its substantial gas reserves. The Region’s producing gas fields already meet local energy needs, but additional reserves could be developed by American and international companies and exported, at market prices, to Iraq and other regional partners. Expanding Kurdish gas production would help reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian imports—a longstanding U.S. policy goal—while supporting greater regional economic integration.

Paying American energy companies what they are owed, combined with meaningful progress in curbing Iran-backed militias, strengthening ties with the Kurdistan Region, and expanding Kurdish gas exports to Iraq, would demonstrate that Iraq is prepared to move beyond old disputes and build a more productive partnership with the United States.

If Zaidi can deliver on these priorities, he will help reset the bilateral relationship toward a more stable, secure, and prosperous future for both countries.