Restraining Israel Is Not the Answer
Donald Trump is not known for hewing to convention, but this week he seemed to rerun a standard Beltway drama. During a phone call on Monday, the president called Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu "crazy" and pressured him to rein in the Israeli offensive in Lebanon. Two days later, the State Department announced it had brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.
The seeming crackup in the Bibi-Trump bromance thrilled Israel’s critics and perturbed the Jewish state’s supporters. Some hope the close working relationship between Trump and Netanyahu is drawing to a close, others fear the entire bond between Washington and Jerusalem to be severed. Israel’s opponents think Trump’s actions to restrain Bibi show that the Jewish state is a strategic liability. But in reality, frictions like this between the two sides are common because of the value Israel provides the United States.
The most recent shouting has been over how to conclude the conflict with Iran. Israel and the United States severely damaged the Islamic regime’s leadership and war machine during their bombing campaign, but since it has not collapsed, their different priorities have emerged. Trump wants the Gulf Arabs’ oil to reach global markets again and to gain control of Iran’s enriched uranium without a return to major combat. Netanyahu wants Hezbollah to stop attacking northern Israel with drones and other long-range weapons. The mullahs claim the fighting in southern Lebanon, which Hezbollah started, is a serious obstacle to further negotiations about an interim agreement, so Trump is trying to find a workable compromise.
This sort of thing happens at the denouement of nearly every war that Israel has had to fight. The American goal in Middle Eastern conflicts usually is for its allies—including Israel—to successfully defend themselves, and then to reestablish peace in the region as quickly as possible. Threats to globally significant infrastructure, such as the Suez Canal or Persian Gulf oil refineries, make Washington nervous. More often than not, after fending off the initial attack, Jerusalem prefers to crush its opponents on the battlefield and destroy their ability to threaten the Jewish state for years or even decades.
This occurs regardless of how warmly the White House regards Israel. After the pan-Arab attempt to destroy Israel in 1948 failed and Israel gained the initiative, Harry Truman halted David Ben-Gurion’s counteroffensive. A decade later during the Suez crisis, Dwight Eisenhower forced Israel and its British and French allies to withdraw from Egypt. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger stopped Israel just short of encircling and annihilating much of the Egyptian Army at the end of the Yom Kippur War. Ronald Reagan forcefully condemned Israel's operations in Lebanon in the 1980s, and George H.W. Bush did everything he could to keep Israel from responding to Saddam Hussein’s unprovoked missile attacks in the first Gulf War.
Both strategies have shown their value at times. Eisenhower thought sparing Gamal Abdel Nasser would win over Third World opinion in the Cold War, but all he did was empower a dictator who cozied up to the Soviet Union and undermined our allies. America would have benefited from a Nasser-less Egypt. Hezbollah rewarded Reagan’s concern for Lebanese civilians by bombing the U.S. embassy and a Marine barracks in Beirut, going on a decades-long spree of international terrorism, repeatedly attacking Israel, and immiserating generations of Lebanese. But if Anwar Sadat had been thoroughly humiliated in 1973 and lost the forces he needed to maintain his grip on power, he could not have spoken in the Knesset in 1977 and then made peace with Israel the next year.
Some Americans mistakenly believe Israeli assertiveness works against our interests in the region. They think the Israelis are too quick to respond to provocations or even slander them as bloodthirsty warmongers. A more realistic assessment shows the same qualities that sometimes make diplomacy with the Jewish state difficult also make it strategically invaluable. Israel’s enemies are also America’s enemies, and Israel punches back hard. Few militaries can project power as far from their borders as Israel’s can. Reining in a bold ally can be hair-raising, but it is far better than trying to rouse a complacent one.
In this case, preventing Israel from dealing with the Hezbollah threat is a mistake. The Lebanese terrorist group does not want peace: It immediately rejected the ceasefire and reportedly killed a U.N. peacekeeper. Similarly, there is little evidence that Iran will address Trump’s other concerns if he stops Israel. The Iranians, who demand access to $24 billion to continue talking and are violating the ceasefire in the Gulf too, are trying to sow distrust between Trump and his regional allies rather than plant the seeds for peace.
Public opinion is turning against the Iran campaign, as the recent House vote reveals. Trump does not need to send in the troops to turn up the heat in Tehran. He can just let the Israelis defend themselves.