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In the May/June 2026 issue of Foreign Affairs, Jung H. Pak and Victor Cha — veterans of the Washington foreign policy establishment —essentially wave the white flag. Pak’s “How North Korea Won” highlights Kim Jong Un’s “strange triumph,” crediting his nuclear buildup, sanctions evasion, and alliances with Russia and China. Cha’s “North Korea as It Is” calls for a “cold peace,” arguing denuclearization is a “distant objective” and the U.S. should settle for arms control talks, nuclear test restrictions, and coexistence with a nuclear-armed Kim.

This is the same tired defeatism that has failed for decades. President Donald Trump rejected it in his first term, and he rejects it now. He still plans to denuclearize North Korea — not accommodate it. The idea that Kim has “won” is not analysis; it is an excuse for weakness.

Appeasement Fails

As I detail in my new book, , released by Texas A&M Press, arguments like those from Pak and Cha embody the bipartisan foreign policy establishment consensus that watched North Korea’s arsenal grow from zero to an estimated 50 warheads with enough fissile material for dozens more, hundreds of missile tests and ICBMs capable of striking the U.S. homeland. (RELATED: Introducing Chongryon, The Large Pro-North Korea Organization In Japan)

Their answers are typical. Learn to live with the North Korean threat. Lower our expectations. Sign more arms control agreements. Appease Pyongyang some more.

The credibility of Cha and Pak is also far from objective on this issue. In 2018, President Trump’s administration considered Cha for nomination as U.S. ambassador to South Korea, only to reportedly decide against it after Cha opposed aspects of the administration’s tough approach to North Korea. Pak served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department’s East Asia Bureau from 2021 to 2024 and as Senior Official for North Korea from 2023 to 2024. It is therefore no surprise that their articles downplay how former President Joe Biden’s weak foreign policy enabled Pyongyang’s advances and caused North Korea to conduct a record number of ballistic missile tests in 2022 and resume ICBM launches and lobbed missiles over Japan during the Biden years. In total, Kim lobbed over 70 missiles in 2022 alone, the most in North Korean history.

Maximum Pressure Works

President Trump’s first-term North Korea policy was a better path. His maximum-pressure campaign — tough sanctions, diplomatic isolation and threats of military force — brought Kim to the negotiating table. For the first time, a North Korean leader negotiated directly with an American president. Nuclear testing halted in 2018. North Korea observed a moratorium on long-range and nuclear missile tests from April 2018 until late 2019. Kim stopped launching missiles over Japan and largely halted directly threatening the U.S. mainland during that period.

Even Trump’s critics credited him with lowering tensions and opening a door to a potential deal for peace and normalization.

 

Beyond Biden

The contrast with the Biden era is stark. North Korea ramped up missile testing to unprecedented levels and forged a dangerous military alliance with Russia — supplying troops and weapons for Ukraine and reportedly receiving advanced satellite, missile, and submarine technology. It also expanded trade with China despite sanctions. This North Korea-Russia axis, which emerged under Biden, will make denuclearization in Trump’s second term significantly harder. (RELATED: Why Does The Japanese Government Place Importance On The Abduction Issue With North Korea?)

The notion that denuclearization is impossible ignores history and Trump’s record. The North Korea policies of prior administrations failed because they treated North Korea like a normal state rather than a criminal regime with nuclear weapons. Trump understood the regime’s psychology: strength and unpredictability command attention; weakness and endless talks without consequences invite more tests.

 

The Ukraine Factor

Pak and Cha appear to believe that Kim’s ties to Moscow and Beijing make a reversal of this situation impossible. These ties will complicate Trump’s diplomatic efforts with Kim. But Trump’s America First approach never assumed North Korea could be solved in isolation. He pressured China economically and confronted Russia when needed. Crucially, ending the war in Ukraine — something only President Trump can achieve — may be the most important step to pressure North Korea. Cutting off Russia’s advanced technology and support to Pyongyang would weaken Kim’s position and restore U.S. leverage.

“Cold peace” is just code for managed decline. Accepting a nuclear North Korea doesn’t stabilize Asia — it destabilizes it. This also tells Iran, China and every would-be proliferator that the United States lacks the will to enforce its red lines. It also threatens our South Korean and Japanese allies, who rely on U.S. extended deterrence. (RELATED: Questioning Military Strategy For Northeast Asia)

The Solution

President Trump has been clear: He wants a deal with Kim Jong Un, but only one that fully ends the nuclear threat. He has no interest in empty photo-ops or signing a bad deal and calling it a victory while leaving American cities vulnerable to North Korean missiles. The American people demand strength — not experts who rush to appease dictators and declare defeat.

Kim Jong Un has not “won.” He has survived by drawing on support from other rogue states and the weakness of the foreign policy establishment. President Trump can end this threat. Maximum pressure, personal diplomacy, and an unwavering commitment to denuclearization remain the only path to real peace. Anything less is surrender dressed as sophistication.