By Andrew Orchard

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) response to Taiwan President Lai’s inauguration highlighted Beijing’s regional assertiveness and military capabilities. That same week, China’s ambassador to Japan implied that the Japanese would be “brought into the fire” over their support for Taiwan’s independence. Both activities underscore why Japan is worried about a potential Taiwan contingency, and Tokyo’s unease is not limited to Beijing’s threats to Taipei.

Recurring PLA operations and increased bilateral training with Russian military forces constitute a challenge backed by military threats close to Japan’s territorial waters. One challenge is the PLA continuous East China Sea patrols and regular exercises near Japan’s Southwest Islands, demonstrated by the March 2024 PLA Eastern Theater Navy patrol adjacent to the Southwest. Type 052C guided missile destroyer Changchun and Type 054A guided missile frigate Changzhou operated south of the islands from March 25 until March 27, 2024. On the last day, a Y-9JB reconnaissance aircraft flew a mission near the patrol, illustrating the well-known risks of escalation to the Southwest Islands during an East China Sea or Taiwan contingency.

Tokyo, in response to these challenges, has taken proactive measures by significantly increasing its Self-Defense Force (JSDF) presence and actively planning to enhance shelter preparedness in the islands to ensure safety and security of its territories.

Japan’s Maritime Boundaries according to the Cabinet Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty.

Beyond East China Sea operations, the PLA also conducts operations in tandem in the Sea of Japan. Recent development and operations by the PLA underscore the severity of the challenge faced by Tokyo. In late March 2024, PLA forces operated in the Sea of Japan for two weeks. Four Northern Theater ships operated in the Sea of Japan from March 17 to March 31. The patrol included Huainan , a Type 52D guided missile destroyer of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla and Daqing, a Type 054A guided missile frigate. The operation consisted of a composition similar to past exercises, leading to speculation that the force possibly conducted training analogous to a “Long-Distance Exercise.” 

Upper Left and Bottom: Japan Joint Staff publicly released WZ-7 UAV image and observed flight route on 26 March. Upper Right: WZ-7 at 2022 Zhuhai Airshow.

Notably, the Northern Theater reported the first mission of a WZ-7 UAV in the Sea of Japan in March 2024, which coincided with the naval operations. Some Japanese media speculated that the WZ-7 transited to the Sea of Japan through North Korean or Russian airspace. The possibility for future WZ-7 Sea of Japan intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions troubled retired JSDF officers. The UAV’s endurance and sensor capability could enable additional PLA collection during JSDF Sea of Japan operations. Moreover, the PLA’s enhanced monitoring capability in the Sea of Japan, demonstrated by the operation of the WZ-7, along with ISR platforms and intelligence collection ships that could force the JSDF to expend more resources in response and “potentially halt training while the PLA collected.”

A timeline of key exercises and operations in the Sea of Japan. (Source: Japan Joint Staff and Global Times.)

Initially, the PLAN conducted irregular operations in the Sea of Japan and focused on gaining out-of-area experience, likely attributed to prioritization of counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden and limited at-sea logistics capacity. Two months before deploying the PLAN inaugural counter-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN expeditiously sailed a four-combatant task group through the Sea of Japan in October 2008, enroute to the Western Pacific Ocean. This move and the PLA’s first Sea of Japan exclusive training mission as part of the 2011 cadet training cruise foreshadowed PLA interest in Sea of Japan operations.

After the first China-Russia Joint Sea exercise in 2013, PLAN activities in the Sea of Japan continue to rise. The increased frequency of operations can be attributed to the improved at-sea logistics capability and the inclusion of such exercises as part of distant seas deployments. Milestones in this progression include the unilateral “Sea of Japan Confrontation Exercise” conducted by PLAN naval forces returning from RIMPAC 2016, and the expanded joint air and naval exercise in the same area in January 2017. The 2019 annual bilateral bomber patrols with Russia marked a significant step in their collaboration, which transitioned to biannual bomber patrols in 2022 and 2023, leading to growing unease.

In a broader sense, Tokyo is deeply concerned that the continued intensification of these operations could pose a significant challenge to Tokyo’s naval capabilities. These capabilities, historically developed for maritime chokepoint control, play a pivotal role in reducing foreign threats to shipping during a contingency, underlining the strategic importance and vulnerability of Japan’s maritime chokepoints. The harsh lessons of the Second World War profoundly influenced Japan’s development of naval capabilities and the associated strategy. Loss of control over Japan’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) led to the devastating sinking of over 1,500 merchant ships during the war. Some Japanese experts view this failure as a causal issue that helped seal Japan’s fate and highlights the importance of historical lessons in shaping current challenges to avoid similar fates. This issue also demonstrates the strategic significance of Japan’s SLOCs and the need for robust naval capabilities to protect them. These historical lessons shaped Japan’s current defense strategy that emphasize the importance of controlling their SLOCs and the need for a strong naval force to protect its maritime interests. 

JMSDF Frigate JS Tatsuta at her commissioning ceremony. (Japan MOD photo)

After the Second World War, Japan relied upon the United States to secure its SLOCs as the nation rebuilt. The relationship shifted with the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense, a significant turning point that outlined sea control in the Sea of Japan and East China Sea as a JMSDF mission. Leveraging its surrounding chokepoints, Tokyo built a maritime force that could limit the freedom of Soviet naval activities against Japan, marking a significant step in developing Tokyo’s naval capabilities.

A February 2024 Nikkei Shimbun article (in English and Japanese) highlighted the growing Japanese apprehension over PLA activities in the Sea of Japan. The article stated that PLA unilateral and bilateral operations with Russia indicate Beijing’s desire to maintain a constant presence in the Sea of Japan. An unnamed former Japanese Defense Ministry intelligence officer cited in the Nikkei article stated that the PLA could deploy strategic forces to the Sea of Japan in the future. This article provides valuable insights into the current perceptions and concerns of the Japanese government and defense experts regarding the PLA’s activities in the Sea of Japan.

Japanese government officials and experts also think the PLA will expand Sea of Japan operations, although Tokyo has not publicly speculated on the future composition of force deployments. Instead, there is a focus on the scope of these activities, including China-Russia bilateral exercises for strategic messaging. Japanese sources cite the 24 May 2022 China-Russia bomber patrol during the ‘Quad’ Tokyo Summit as a prime example of such messaging. The messaging is assessed as part of both nations’ efforts to challenge the status quo in East Asia and pressure Tokyo. This strategic messaging, if successful, could undermine Japan’s regional influence and security, and consequently impact the broader geopolitical implications of the PLA’s activities in the Sea of Japan. 

Furthermore, the use of each Beijing and Moscow airfields during bomber patrols signifies an increase in interoperability and government relations, causing growing unease in Tokyo. The prospect of further enhanced China-Russia logistics cooperation, to include port access, could enable sustained Chinese pressure on Japan and its SLOCs during a contingency, posing a significant threat to Japan’s security and economic stability. The Japan Forum for Strategic Studies 2023 Taiwan Policy Simulation emphasized this issue and addressed that similar pressure can complicate Tokyo’s decision-making in future contingencies.

The Japan Ministry of Defense believes countering this challenge requires not just individual efforts, but a collective commitment to foster a security environment that is unwilling to tolerate unilateral changes to the status quo. Active military engagement with like-minded countries that emphasize the importance of collective action and cooperation in maintaining regional stability and security will help ensure continued stability. 

These engagements, like the recent Australia-Japan-Philippines-U.S. South China Sea patrol, often occur outside the Sea of Japan. Despite the physical geographic separation, the exercises are essential for Japan’s security because these exercises showcase defense capabilities and demonstrate a public display of the willingness of nations to stand up for shared principles. Mr. Iida at the National Institute of Defense Studies noted:

“Demonstrating to China and Russia the will and ability to maintain the status quo by force through joint exercises with many countries that share interests in maintaining the existing international order will lead to the stability of the regional order through deterrence.”

The recent patrol, which involved multiple countries, demonstrates the collaborative efforts of like-minded nations as they seek to counter the PLA’s activities and maintain the regional order. Regional relationships and engagements will need to pace the growth of the PLA Navy, and keep up with its expanding operations.

Andrew Orchard is a U.S. Navy Officer and former Mansfield Fellow. This article was written in Spring 2024 as part of the author’s research on Japan’s maritime security policy during his Mansfield Fellowship.

The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation.

Featured Image: Guided-missile frigates Bayannaoer (Hull 551), Dali (Hull 553) and Tongliao (Hull 554) attached to a naval flotilla under the Chinese PLA Southern Theater Command sail in formation during a maritime combat training exercise in late September, 2025. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Yu Chuanjun)

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