As Ukraine enters its fourth year of defending against a full-scale Russian invasion, there is a feeling of change in the air — hope that 2025 might bring an end to the fighting, but deep concern that a high price might be paid for a fleeting and unjust peace.

Russia is at its weakest since February 2022:  economically, militarily and politically.  Inflation is running rampant, interest rates are pegged at a staggering 21%, there is both a manpower shortage for the army and a labor shortage in the civilian economy, the state budget is in deficit, and without access to global financial markets, it is burning through its remaining foreign exchange reserves. It is reliant on North Korea for ammunition and manpower, and Iran for drones.

Within six months to a year, Russia will need a pause in the war. But until then, the Kremlin’s overnight bombing offensive and front-line assaults continue.  

Ukraine is also feeling the strains of war. The population is tired. Even though the casualty ratio is roughly 3:1 in Ukraine’s favor, the Ukrainians care more about that one soldier than Russia does for dozens of its own troops. The front line has scarcely moved in two years, but the costs to Ukraine are high.

US President Donald Trump is now shaking up everything. He seeks to end the war as soon as possible — something Ukraine clearly desires — but Ukrainians fear the terms will reward Russia. Trump has promised lower global energy prices and sanctions if Russia does not end the war – yet he has also blocked UN language naming Russia as an aggressor, called President Zelenskyy a dictator, and threatened to cut off military support to Ukraine if Zelenskyy does not share 50% of Ukraine’s natural resource revenue with the United States. He has alienated America’s European allies, even as he wants them to shoulder more of Europe’s — and Ukraine’s — defense burden.  

The coming weeks will determine what a possible peace in Ukraine could look like. It may be that once again, an unjust war turns into an uneasy “peace.” This time, however, Ukraine and the West must use the time a ceasefire provides better than Russia.  

Russia will of course use a ceasefire to re-group, re-arm, conduct hybrid warfare, and prepare the next full-scale invasion. Ukraine and the West must come together to strengthen Ukraine militarily, rebuild the economy, provide credible security assurances, and accelerate Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. This will deter Putin from further attacks. Anything less will allow Putin to plot Russian new attacks against Ukraine and possibly other European countries with impunity.

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Despite the drama surrounding the Trump administration’s various policy statements, the key pillars of Trump’s approach seem clear. They are:  ceasefire, reciprocity, deterrence, and burden-sharing.  

Achieving a ceasefire is Trump’s number one objective. He has a commendable humanitarian impulse just to want to stop the killing. But he refuses to acknowledge publicly that the reason for all the killing is Putin’s imperialist and genocidal policies. There would be no war at all absent the Russian desire to conquer Ukraine and deny its historical and cultural heritage. Trump is pressuring both Ukraine and Russia in order to achieve a ceasefire as quickly as possible.

The second pillar is reciprocity. As Trump sees it, the American taxpayers have given at least $100bn of aid to Ukraine, with no strategic outcome, and are getting nothing in return. He seeks to put in place mechanisms whereby America gets paid back for the assistance already given, and will be paid in real time for future military support, from Ukraine’s potential resource revenue streams. This would put America’s military support for Ukraine on a sustainable business-like footing. While callous from a human point of view, it is more sustainable from a political point of view.

The third pillar is deterrence: As much as Trump wants an immediate end to the fighting, he also wants to prevent a future war, lest it disrupt his reputation as a peacemaker worthy of a Nobel Prize. This means putting enough capability on the table to deter Putin from launching a new war. In the short run, this should not be difficult, given the challenges facing Russia’s economy and military effort. But in the medium-to-long term, it will require substantial Western commitment to Ukraine in order to convince Putin that future attacks will be costly and ultimately futile.

Finally, the fourth pillar is about burden-sharing. Trump has long held the view that European allies freeload on America’s willingness to shoulder the burden of providing security for Europe. He aims to dramatically rebalance the Atlantic Alliance, pushing European allies to spend 5% of GDP on defense, while the US cuts its own defense budget. This includes having Europe take the lead on security assurances for Ukraine, and possibly providing a deterrent force deployed in Ukraine for training and equipping the Ukrainian military and assisting with air defense. 

If these four pillars do not come together, Trump may well be tempted to throw Ukraine under the bus. But if they do — ceasefire, reciprocity, deterrence and burden-sharing — it would satisfy Trump’s policy objectives, while guaranteeing Ukrainian sovereignty, independence, and future security. 

And that, in turn, buys time for Ukraine that extends beyond the next four years. 

Ambassador Kurt Volker is a former US Ambassador to NATO and a former US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. He is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

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CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.

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