[ CYPHER CODE #349  ]
Canada did not debate this shift. It happened in the delivery room.

[ CYPHER CODE #350 ]
Forty percent is not an accident. It’s a policy outcome.

[ CYPHER CODE #351 ]
A silent shift is always the most durable one.

BRIEFING

Grant here. It feels like Canada just opened the blinds and realized almost half of its future population is no longer being produced by the families who have maple syrup and poutine running through their veins. The country is not replenishing its own lineage, and the growth is now coming from a completely different direction. But honestly, it doesn’t look like this shift happened by chance. It looks a lot more like policy than circumstance. Let’s break it down.

Canada just released a number that should have set off a national debate, but it seems to have slid by practically unnoticed. More than 40% of newborns now have foreign-born mothers, a figure that has nearly doubled in less than thirty years.

And to be clear, there was no public vote on this direction. No referendum. No point where the country was asked if this was the demographic future it wanted.

Here’s the chart that finally forced people to look.

SOURCE

In 2024, more than two in five newborns (42.3%) in Canada had a foreign-born mother (i.e., a mother who was born outside Canada), a proportion that has nearly doubled in just over a quarter of a century (22.5% in 1997).

The adjusted proportion of foreign-born women among women of childbearing age was estimated at 32.3% in the 2021 Census, slightly lower than the percentage of births to foreign-born mothers, which was 33.0% the same year. This trend has been observed in the last five censuses, suggesting that foreign-born women are more likely to give birth in Canada than Canadian-born women of the same age.

Without the contribution of foreign-born mothers, the total number of births in Canada would have declined faster since 2010.

Without the contribution of foreign-born individuals to births and deaths, natural increase in Canada would have been negative since 2022.

In 2024, nearly three in five babies (57.0%) born to mothers over the age of 40 had a foreign-born mother. At the other end of the spectrum, among babies born to mothers aged 19 and under, just over 1 in 10 babies (12.8%) had a foreign-born mother.

In 2024, Ontario and British Columbia had the highest proportion of births to foreign-born mothers (48.7% each), while the lowest proportion was observed in the Atlantic provinces (23.6%).

From 1997 to 2024, the largest increases in the number of births to foreign-born mothers were recorded in Saskatchewan (+437%), the Atlantic provinces (+298%), Alberta (+264%) and Manitoba (+206%).

Among all births in Canada, the proportion of mothers born in India increased nearly fivefold, rising from 2.1% in 1997 to 10.3% in 2024. As a result, India was the most prevalent country of origin among foreign-born mothers in 2024.

After India, the second-most common country of origin among foreign-born mothers in 2024 was the Philippines, representing 3.1% of all births, followed by China (2.0% of all births).

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But then on top of these numbers, there’s the overall fertility of Canadians, which really adds the structural backdrop that tells the very real and very alarming story of Canada’s shifting population.

According to the numbers, Canada’s total fertility rate recently hit a record low of 1.33 children per woman in 2022 and dropped further to 1.26 children per woman in 2023.

When a country cannot replace its population without outside births, immigration becomes the policy swing lever, and clearly the public rarely ever votes on that specific lever. At least not directly.

SOURCE

In 2022, Canada’s total fertility rate (TFR) reached its lowest level on record, at 1.33 children per woman.

Most (10 out of 13) provinces and territories saw their TFR reach a record low in 2022.

The decrease in the TFR from 2021 to 2022 (-7.4%) is the largest decrease since 1971 to 1972 (-7.6%), at the height of the “baby bust” that followed the baby boom (1946 to 1965).

The drop in the TFR in 2022 was not unique to Canada, although Canada’s decrease was one of the largest among high-income countries. Apart from the United States, all G7 countries experienced a fertility decline between 2021 and 2022.

Over the period from 1921 to 2022, the lowest TFRs occurred in the last five years: 2022 (1.33), 2020 (1.41), 2021 (1.44), 2019 (1.47) and 2018 (1.51).

From 2021 to 2022, fertility rates decreased in all age groups of women less than 40.

Following a period of slow and steady decrease from 2009 to 2019, Canada’s TFR was relatively volatile from 2020 to 2022, with an initial large downward swing, then an increase, followed by another drop. This three-year pattern observed in Canada runs in parallel with the experience of many other countries over the same period, suggesting the COVID-19 pandemic may have temporarily disrupted fertility behaviours.

Monthly birth patterns suggest many women briefly postponed conceiving a child in the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic but resumed their childbearing plans fairly quickly afterward.

The average age of mothers at childbirth has been increasing without interruption for nearly five decades, from 26.7 years in 1976 to 31.6 years in 2022.

So returning back to the immigration lever, which again, is really doing all the heavy lifting when it comes to Canada’s population.

Canada’s government set an admission target of 485,000 permanent residents in 2024, with plans to top 500,000 in both 2025 and 2026.

That level of intake radically changes the foundational population makeup of the country long before even one baby is born. It’s not subtle. It’s sweeping.

SOURCE

In 2022, Canada received 438 000 new immigrants on a long-term or permanent basis (including changes of status), 8% more than in 2021. This figure comprises 31% labour migrants, 50% family members (including accompanying family) and 17% humanitarian migrants. Around 275 000 permits were issued to tertiary-level international students and 155 000 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants.

India, China and Afghanistan were the top three nationalities of newcomers in 2022. Among the top 15 countries of origin, Afghanistan registered the strongest increase (15 000) and India the largest decrease (‑9 700) in flows to Canada compared to the previous year.

In 2023, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 55%, to reach around 147 000. The majority of applicants came from Mexico (24 000), India (12 000) and Nigeria (9 300). The largest increase since 2022 concerned nationals of Mexico (7 500) and the largest decrease nationals of Haiti (‑5 600). Of the 66 000 decisions taken in 2023, 60% were positive.

Emigration of Canadian citizens to OECD countries increased by 19% in 2022, to 41 000. Approximately 47% of this group migrated to the United States, 7% to Mexico and 7% to the United Kingdom.

Canada’s 2024‑26 Immigration Levels Plan follows the trajectory outlined in 2023‑25, aiming to admit 485 000 permanent residents in 2024, and 500 000 in both 2025 and 2026. The focus remains on immigration’s contribution to economic growth, with 60% of permanent admissions in 2025 allocated to the economic class, and to support Francophone communities outside of Quebec.

DEBRIEFING

Canada’s numbers only look shocking because the country never framed them as part of a larger strategy. The shift didn’t happen in a vacuum. It unfolded through a mix of declining fertility among Canadian-born families and an immigration architecture designed to keep the population growing even as fewer Canadians have children. That combination creates demographic momentum that feels sudden, but it has been building for decades.

Then the picture becomes even clearer when you line up the data. Foreign-born mothers accounted for more than 40% of births in 2024, almost double the share from the late nineties. Provinces like Ontario and British Columbia are even further along, with births to foreign-born mothers reaching nearly half of all newborns. These are not fringe trends. They are early indicators of where national policy has been steering the country.

The fertility drop is the quiet engine behind the change. Canada’s rate has fallen to one of the lowest levels in its history, well below replacement. A country that cannot produce enough new citizens will naturally turn to immigration as the stabilizing mechanism. The government set targets near half a million new permanent residents per year, with plans to surpass that pace in the years to follow. And these decisions reshape the base population long before the general population even realizes what the numbers represent.

But frankly, this entire problem isn’t unique to Canada. Other Western nations are moving along parallel tracks. Fertility declines, aging populations, and economic models built on continuous growth push governments toward large-scale immigration as the default solution. The result is a population structure that shifts quickly while the public processes the change slowly. It feels organic, but it’s all powered by policy.

The point here is not to necessarily argue if the shift is good or bad. The point is that it is happening without open debate. Demographic direction is being set through long-range administrative decisions rather than public choice. If citizens are not part of the conversation, the transformation will always feel like it arrived out of nowhere.

NOW YOU KNOW

Canada’s demographic shift didn’t just appear out of thin air. It was built through policy, accelerated by declining fertility, and delivered without public discussion.