Trouble in Muslim paradise?

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Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been close allies and partners and leading members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) founded in 1981, essentially by UAE and Kuwait. The GCC brought together six Gulf states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the states with the largest populations. The Saudi population is estimated to be 36.01 million and the UAE’s approximately 11,346,000. In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar, severing diplomatic ties and implementing land, sea, and air restrictions, accusing it of supporting terrorism and interfering in regional affairs, particularly backing groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and fostering ties with Iran.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE share geopolitical interests and cooperate militarily, and both are members of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). They have strong economic links and joint committees that manage energy, finance, and investment projects. To some extent, they have shared in the Al-Arabiya network, which was launched in 2003 from Dubai in the UAE, to serve as a competitor to the Qatari network of Al Jazeera. The Saudi government does, however, hold a major stake of 54% in the conglomerate called the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC). The network has since moved its operation from Dubai to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

As previously mentioned, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have historically been close allies based on their shared interests, being united against Iran and Islamist groups (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood). In recent years, however, they have experienced growing strategic competition, especially in Yemen and Sudan. There is now a “frenemy” dynamic, where cooperation co-exists with rivalry over regional dominance, foreign policies, and economic models, leading to increasing tensions, despite mutual interests in stability and development projects.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have not always seen eye to eye, even on matters related to the GCC. They have differed on a single GCC currency, primarily due to a power struggle over the location and structure of the proposed regional central bank, with the UAE withdrawing from the monetary union project after the bank was slated for Riyadh, not Abu Dhabi, reflecting deeper economic competition and contrasting visions for regional financial dominance. The UAE favored a decentralized system, whereas Saudi Arabia pushed for a centralized one, stalling progress on the single currency (Khaleej) for years.

The Saudi-backed government in Yemen is currently led by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), chaired by Dr. Rashad al-Alimi, who took over from President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi in 2022 and heads an eight-member body representing various anti-Houthi factions, though recent events show internal rifts, especially with southern separatists (STC). For some time, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been working together to support the Yemeni government against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in the north. But southern separatists, known as the Southern Transitional Council (STC), began attacking Yemeni government forces, hoping to control the southern part of the country with the goal of establishing an independent South Yemen once again. The STC took control of military bases in Aden — the city where the government had set up its capital after Houthi rebels pushed it out of the north. Iran-backed Houthi rebels still control critical northwestern territories, including the capital, Sanaa. The Saudi supported government has lost more strategic areas in southern Yemen to the STC, which has been trained and supported by the UAE.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are supporting different sides in Sudan’s civil war, fueling the conflict; Saudi Arabia backs the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General al-Burhan, viewing them as legitimate state authority, whereas the UAE provides significant military and financial support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), aiming for economic influence, especially over gold mines, creating a regional proxy conflict. Riyadh recognizes al-Burhan as the sole legitimate authority in Sudan. Reports from early 2026 indicate Saudi Arabia is negotiating a $4-billion package for JF-17 fighter jets from Pakistan, potentially intended for the SAF.

The UAE’s involvement is driven by a desire for regional economic dominance. Dubai is a major global gold-trading and refining hub, and maintaining this status requires a massive and continuous influx of raw gold. The UAE, with no significant domestic gold mines, imports vast quantities, with a large percentage coming from Africa, including Sudan.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE differ in their approach to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, with the UAE favoring continued engagement and normalization (Abraham Accords), whereas Saudi Arabia links normalization to Israeli cooperation with its commitment to a path for Palestinian statehood.

Somaliland is yet another area of contention between the two Gulf allies. The United Arab Emirates has reportedly “quietly” recognized Somaliland by accepting its passports, while simultaneously barring travelers with Somali documents. This significant policy shift follows Israel’s move to become the first U.N. member-state to officially recognize the breakaway region. Although Abu Dhabi has not issued an official declaration, a change on its visa website has drawn attention.

Abu Dhabi’s move aligns with its deep-seated strategic interests in the Horn of Africa. Central to the UAE’s strategy is the Port of Berbera, managed by Dubai-based DP World, which offers a vital alternative to Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden. By strengthening ties with Somaliland, the UAE aims to secure its maritime influence and counter regional rivals like Saudi Arabia, which remains allied with Somalia’s federal government in Mogadishu. While UAE and Israel seem to be on the same side on Somaliland, Saudi Arabia’s stance on Somaliland joins Qatar and Turkey.

The United States seeks close relations with the two Gulf states, but the UAE is far more aligned with American and Israeli interests in promoting more Arab and Muslim countries joining the Abraham Accords.

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Image: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Credit: Needpix.