Many Trump Administration officials say outmaneuvering China has been their top priority all along. The threat to take back the Panama Canal pushed that country closer into the U.S.’s sphere. The $20 billion bailout to Argentina’s libertarian President Javier Milei headed off Buenos Aires from seeking needed capital from China. His efforts in Venezuela are intended to force out Chinese investments in that country’s oil sector. But some pro-Trump strategists question the Administration’s focus. While Trump kept in place Biden’s submarine deal with Australia, preserving a key pillar of U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, his approach to China has otherwise been more transactional.

“We are locked in great-power competition with China,” says Katherine Thompson, who was a deputy senior adviser in the Pentagon early in Trump’s second term. “Unfortunately, we are 10 months in and we have gotten incredibly distracted.”

In June, NATO allies agreed to increase their annual defense-spending target to 5% of GDP by 2035, acquiescing on an issue Trump had been harping on for years. It was a success that Trump sees as proof his deal-oriented style can bear fruit. It also potentially frees up the U.S. to relocate more resources to the Indo-Pacific region.

Trump’s bravado works best when he sets a clear goal and follows through, says Thompson. She compared his dealings with Panama and Houthi militants in Yemen—where such clarity led to accomplishments—with situations like Venezuela. “That’s where the America First and Trump’s mantra of foreign policy begins to fall short,” she says. “Where we don’t have clear presidential intent, with clear left and right boundaries defined.”

Bacon says allies in the Pacific are watching Trump’s decisions elsewhere and drawing their own conclusions. “They see statements on Ukraine and NATO, they probably wonder, what does this mean for them,” he says, suggesting that Beijing may be asking a more pointed question: whether American ambiguity in Europe signals opportunity in Asia. “If I was President,” says Bacon, “I would be ensuring Taiwan had the weapons they need to deter right now, because day one of the war is too late.” 

At home, Trump’s approval rating slid in December to 36%. His unpopularity puts a limit on how much political capital he can spend on international goals. But Trump insists his globe-spanning diplomacy is domestic policy. He sees himself extracting investment promises from the Gulf to build up manufacturing and tech development in the U.S. He wants to open Venezuela’s vast oil reserves to U.S. energy production. He made more European defense investment part of the price for support of Ukraine.

As his first year back in the White House comes to a close, Trump says he wants a string of historic deals in year two—a lasting Gaza peace, an end to the Ukraine war, concessions from China on trade and minerals. He also vows to hold Venezuela firmly inside the U.S. sphere of influence—an update of the 19th century Monroe Doctrine he’s dubbed the “Donroe Doctrine.” If he achieves even a fraction of this, the world will look different. Certainly the coming 12 months will test whether his roughshod approach to international affairs yields sustainable wins—or simply incubates deeper global instability.

“If we end up with a scenario where U.S. alliance relationships are still intact, but everybody is paying much more and investing much more in defense—that’s not the worst outcome in the world,” says Brands. But that assessment comes with a warning. Trump’s bravado risks undermining trust in the very alliances that have sustained American power. If allies start to believe “the U.S. just fundamentally won’t be there when a security crisis comes,” Brands says, “then we’re looking at a much bigger and more disruptive geopolitical reordering.”