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The debate over whether Mexican cartels “fit” the classic definition of terrorism risks becoming a legal alibi for inaction.

Although these organizations do not pursue a political utopia or a revolutionary ideology, they produce effects identical to—and in many cases greater than—those of traditional terrorism: territorial control, mass intimidation of civilians, institutional collapse, and systematic violence against the state.

Insisting that ideological motivation alone defines terrorism is a formalistic and outdated reading when confronted with non-state armed actors capable of paralyzing entire regions, capturing institutions, and openly challenging national governments. The problem is no longer merely semantic, but structural.

Mexico claims to be defending its sovereignty, but sovereignty cannot become a shield to preserve legal frameworks that no longer reflect reality—much less a pretext for failing to confront criminal organizations responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, inside and outside its territory, every year.

The United States, for its part, has opted for a pragmatic approach by expanding its legal tools. Europe watches cautiously, although that distance may prove unsustainable if criminal networks continue to expand within its territory.

The debate is not whether the cartels terrorize—they do—but which legal instruments states use to confront them without breaking the balance between security, sovereignty, and the rule of law.

The Mexican definition of terrorism

Mexican law defines terrorism as the use of violence for political or ideological purposes, aimed at pressuring the government, altering the constitutional order, or intimidating the population in order to achieve a political objective.

Cartels, by contrast, have historically been treated as criminal organizations driven by profit, dedicated to drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, and territorial control.

Even though they employ terror-like tactics—public executions, collective threats, forced displacement—their objective does not fit, under the current legal framework, the central element of terrorism: political or ideological motivation.

For this reason, Mexico prosecutes them under ordinary criminal law (homicide, kidnapping, organized crime, drug trafficking), rather than through anti-terrorism legislation. In Mexican legal terms, the equation has been clear: violence for economic ends does not equal terrorism for political ends.

Neither the Constitution nor the Penal Code contains a category that allows cartels to be defined as terrorist organizations, as is the case with classical terrorist groups.

Alleged sovereignty and resistance to external labels

Mexico’s refusal is not only technical, but deeply geopolitical. After the United States’ 2025 decision to designate several cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, Mexico protested through diplomatic channels, raised the issue in international forums, and argued that such a label could open the door to interpretations of foreign intervention.

President Claudia Sheinbaum was explicit: Mexico does not accept legal categories imposed from abroad that could erode its sovereignty. She even proposed constitutional safeguards to prevent foreign judicial or security actions without the consent of the Mexican state.

For the Mexican government, the risk is not semantic, but strategic.

Presidential denial and evidence to the contrary

The Mexican government’s position is not limited to a restrictive legal interpretation of terrorism. The presidency has gone further, explicitly denying the existence of structural links between the Mexican state and drug cartels, as well as rejecting the notion that these organizations exercise territorial control comparable to quasi-insurgent armed actors.

President Sheinbaum has argued that Mexico is not a “narco-state,” that there is no policy of institutional collusion, and that external accusations respond to self-interested narratives designed to justify political or economic pressure from abroad. Under this framework, any attempt to equate cartels with terrorist organizations is portrayed as a direct attack on national sovereignty.

However, this official narrative clashes with a cumulative body of judicial, financial, and operational evidence that is difficult to ignore.

In the United States, formal indictments in federal courts have for years documented systematic cooperation between cartel leaders and public officials at various levels: municipal police, state authorities, and in some cases federal structures. These conclusions do not stem from political statements, but from court records, sworn testimony, financial seizures, and criminal convictions.

Added to this are reports from U.S. agencies describing how cartels not only traffic drugs, but control strategic routes, ports, border crossings, local economies, and entire populations, imposing rules, punishments, and loyalties through extreme violence. This territorial control—although profit-driven—produces effects indistinguishable from those of classic terrorism: forced displacement, collapse of the rule of law, and subjugation of civilians.

The fentanyl case is particularly revealing. Production, trafficking, and distribution networks operating from Mexico have been identified as directly responsible for a public health crisis in the United States involving hundreds of thousands of deaths. The scale, lethality, and persistence of the phenomenon have led Washington to treat it not as a mere criminal issue, but as a direct threat to national security.

25% tariffs: when pressure ceases to be symbolic

In this context, the U.S. response has not been limited to criminal or diplomatic arenas. The U.S. administration has explicitly linked the fight against fentanyl to economic measures, including the imposition—or credible threat—of 25% tariffs on Mexican products as a tool of pressure.

These tariffs do not respond to classic trade logic, but to a coercive national security strategy. The message is unequivocal: if the flow of fentanyl is not effectively controlled, the cost will not be merely reputational or diplomatic, but economic.

From the U.S. perspective, this policy reflects accumulated frustration after years of declarative cooperation without proportional results. For Mexico, by contrast, it reinforces the perception that the terrorism label is not neutral, but a mechanism to justify sanctions, economic pressure, and a unilateral redefinition of the problem.

The key fact is that the debate has ceased to be academic. Mexico’s refusal to recognize the structural dimension of the phenomenon is no longer met only with rhetoric, but with concrete decisions that have real impacts on trade, investment, and bilateral relations.

The United States: when terrorism is redefined

Unlike Mexico, U.S. law does not require a pure ideological motivation to activate its anti-terrorism tools. Under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the State Department may designate as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) any group that is foreign, engages in “terrorist activity” as defined by U.S. law, and threatens U.S. national security, citizens, or foreign policy interests.

In 2025, following an executive order by President Donald Trump, several Mexican cartels—including the Sinaloa Cartel and CJNG—were added to the FTO list. The central argument was clear: their mass violence and drug trafficking constitute a direct threat to U.S. national security.

What does this designation really mean?

It does not amount to a declaration of war or an automatic military intervention. It does entail asset freezes, criminalization of material support in any country, harsher sanctions, and an expanded extraterritorial reach of U.S. justice.

U.S. officials have stressed that there will be no deployments in Mexico without consent, but the conceptual shift is profound: drug trafficking ceases to be merely a criminal problem and becomes a national security threat.

Spain and the European Union: legal caution

The European Union defines terrorism as acts intended to “seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures” of a state or international organization. This definition remains anchored in political or ideological intent.

As a result, Mexican cartels do not appear on the EU list of terrorist organizations (Common Position 2001/931/CFSP).

An emerging debate

Some European policymakers have suggested following the U.S. example, but the EU Council has opted for caution. The reasons cited include legal certainty, diplomatic risks, and the difficulty of drawing a clear boundary between terrorism and organized crime.

Europe fears diluting the concept of terrorism and creating precedents that are difficult to control.

What could Spain and Europe do?

A phased and realistic approach could include:

Adjusting legal frameworks to incorporate extreme forms of violent organized crime within terrorism offenses when there is systematic intimidation of civilians and territorial control.

Strengthening international cooperation, prioritizing shared intelligence, financial tracking, and effective extraditions.

Targeting money and weapons, striking at money laundering in Europe and arms trafficking routes.

Addressing structural causes by reducing drug demand and strengthening prevention and development policies.

A third path

Neither Mexican denial nor unilateral U.S. expansion offers, on its own, a lasting solution. A third path may lie in:

Updating legal definitions and recognizing a hybrid category of transnational organized crime with terrorizing violence.

Prioritizing financial attacks, because the true strength of cartels is not their nonexistent ideology, but their money.

Fostering international cooperation without subordination, based on shared intelligence and mutual respect.Assuming shared responsibility, recognizing that violence is fueled by drug demand, arms trafficking, and international financial flows.

The question is no longer only legal. It is political, strategic, and profoundly international.

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About The Author Maria Herrera Mellado

María Herrera Mellado es una abogada y analista política muy respetada. Licenciada en Derecho en EE.UU. y España, también tiene un doctorado en Ciencias Jurídicas y varios títulos de la Universidad de Granada (España), de la Universidad de Arizona y de la Florida International University. Con amplia experiencia en derecho internacional, asesoría en inversiones, representación en inmigración, y protección de la privacidad y lucha anticorrupción, ha asesorado a organizaciones y políticos europeos, estadounidenses e hispanoamericanos. Ha escrito sobre seguridad nacional e inmigración, protección de datos, derecho constitucional, consumo financiero y derecho bancario en revistas internacionales y coescribió libros publicados en Perú y Colombia. Es reconocida por su servicio comunitario en EE.UU. y es considerada una de las mujeres más influyentes de Florida. Es experta en varios idiomas y participa frecuentemente en debates en canales como Univisión, Fox, France 24, Telemundo y es la Editora Jefe de Gateway Hispanic.